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Despite a decade of litigation, there is no consistent understanding of the
reasonable accommodation requirement of Title I of the ADA. Indeed, there are
three inconsistent distributive outcomes that appear to comport with the
reasonable accommodation requirement: cost-shifting, cost-sharing, and costavoidance.
One reason for such inconsistent outcomes is a failure to develop a coherent
and consistent theory of disability. Because disability has been and continues to
be medicalized, this Article takes a fresh look at the medical literature on health,
illness, and disability. It recommends the use of the experiential health model
over the currently accepted functional health model to understand disability in
the context of the ADA because it captures the contextual, socially-constructed,
and political nature of disability.
A second, related reason for inconsistent outcomes is an ambivalent attitude
toward the costs of antidiscrimination law, often expressed as a tension between
efficiency and rights. This Article examines disability-based discrimination in
the workplace in this context, revealing the underlying tension between
disability discrimination as a civil rights issue, and the view of disability
discrimination as a social safety net issue.
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Using a theory of disability informed by an experiential definition of health
and the distributive analysis to evaluate the three distributive outcomes
demonstrates that, although flawed, cost-shifting is the best outcome because it
embodies an experiential-social model of disability and the potential for both
socioeconomic and political reconstruction.
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1

Despite intense interest in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(the “ADA”) for over a decade, there is no consistent understanding of
the reasonable accommodation requirement of Title I, the employment
title. Indeed, at least three distinct distributive outcomes appear to
comport with the requirements of the ADA. An employee with a
2
disability who is willing and able to work within the meaning of the
statute may: 1) receive reasonable accommodation as defined by law; 2)
privately bargain for some level of accommodation, as defined by the
bargaining parties; or 3) leave the workplace with employer-sponsored
disability leave benefits.
These inconsistencies point to more
fundamental questions — what does it mean to have a disability, and
3
what, if anything, is society obligated to do for people with disabilities?
The aim of this Article is to begin to build answers to these questions.
Part I outlines the reasonable accommodation requirement of Title I of
the ADA and identifies three inconsistent distributive outcomes
pursuant to the ADA’s requirements: 1) cost shifting from the employee
to the employer, based on the ADA’s requirement that employers make
reasonable accommodation for qualified individuals with disabilities; 2)
cost sharing between the employee and the employer, based on
observations that the ADA has actually created a zone of bargaining
rather than shifting the costs to the employer, and 3) cost avoidance,
which occurs when the operation of another federal law, The Employee
4
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), enables the
employer to avoid the requirement of reasonable accommodation. Part
II re-examines the medical literature for support in developing a
coherent theory of disability that is currently lacking, and identifies the
experiential health model as particularly valuable because it captures the

1

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
This Article uses the term “individual with a disability,” rather than terms such as
“disabled person” or “handicapped person,” which tend to define the individual only in
terms of the disability. For a discussion of the social meaning of common terminology
used to identify or describe people with disabilities, see generally Paul K. Longmore, A
Note on Language and the Social Identity of Disabled People, 28 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 419
(1985); Tanya Titchkosky, Disability: A Rose By Any Other Name? “People First” Language in
Canadian Society, 38 CAN. REV. SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 125 (2001).
3
See Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 214-15, 213-222 (2000) (defining a disability as limitation on
what people are assumed to be able to do without assistance).
4
29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1994).
2
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contextual, socially-constructed, and political nature of disability. Part
III explores the ambivalent attitude toward the costs of
antidiscrimination law and disability-based discrimination in the
workplace, in particular revealing a “deep tension between the view of
disability discrimination as a civil rights problem, and the view of
5
disability discrimination as a social safety net issue.” Finally, Part IV
uses a theory of disability informed by an experiential definition of
health as well as the distributive analysis to evaluate the three
distributive outcomes and demonstrates that, although flawed, costshifting is the best outcome.
I. THE THREE FACES OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
The ADA was enacted to “provide strong, consistent, [and]
enforceable standards [for] ending discrimination against individuals
with disabilities,” and to bring such individuals into the economic and
6
social mainstream of American life. In an attempt to remedy the
widespread problem of discrimination against people with disabilities,
Congress used its power under the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment and prohibited discrimination “across the entire
vista of modern society: discrimination is prohibited in employment,
public services, public transportation, public accommodations and
7
public services operated by private entities and telecommunications.”
Structurally and substantively, the ADA is based on Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, national origin, sex, and religion. However, the ADA faces
unique challenges to the implementation of civil rights for people with
disabilities not faced by Title VII, or prior federal statutes aimed at
8
protection of the rights of people with disabilities.

5
Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Introduction to AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES: EXPLORING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS
xv (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) [hereinafter AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES].
6
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(2) (1994).
7
See 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1964).
8
Other federal statutes which protect people with disabilities include the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1485 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(guaranteeing that each child with disabilities will have “individualized plan” so that he or
she can receive “free appropriate education”), the Developmental Disabilities Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15001-15115 (2000) (guaranteeing that
individuals with developmental disabilities and their families participate in design of and
have access to needed community services, individualized supports and other needs of
assistance), the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 41705 (1994) (amended 2000)
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Two distinctive structural features of the ADA stand out in the context
of Title I — the definition of “disability” and its role in defining the
protected group, and the reasonable accommodation requirement. First,
unlike the case for race or sex, protection for people with disabilities
raises questions about who should be eligible for protection. Because the
ADA grants standing only to individuals who meet the statutory
definition of “disabled,” it is critical to understand who is covered by
that definition. Despite the ADA’s apparent attempt at a broad
definition of the meaning of “disability,” with respect to any individual:
1) physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
9
major life activities; or 2) a record of such impairment; or 3) being
regarded as having such an impairment regardless of whether the
10
individual actually has the impairment, the definition of disability
11
remains a controversial and hotly litigated issue. Title I also provides
(prohibits any carrier, including a foreign carrier from discriminating against an otherwise
qualified individual with a mental or physical handicap), the Voting Accessibility for the
Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §1973ee1-1973ee6 (1984) (improves access
for handicapped and elderly individuals to registration facilities and polling places for
federal elections), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-796 (1994 & Supp III 1997)
(creates regulations for employment of disabled individuals under federal government
contracts; prohibits any program or activity receiving federal assistance from
discriminating against, excluding from participation, or denying benefits to any otherwise
qualified individual with disability; orders removal of architectural, transportation, or
communication barriers; guarantees that federal employees and members of public who
are disabled have same access to and use of information and data as federal employees and
members of the public who are not disabled; provides support system in each state to
protect legal and human rights of individuals who are otherwise ineligible under 29 U.S.C.
§ 732, 42 U.S.C. § 15041 (2000), 42 U.S.C. § 10801 (1986)), the Fair Housing Act Amendments
of 1988 (FHAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994 & Supp III 1997) (prohibits discrimination on
basis of handicap in sale or rental of housing, in residential real estate related transactions
and in provision of brokerage services). For discussion of the history and effectiveness of
these statutes, see RUTH COLKER & BONNIE PODRIAS TUCKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION (3d ed. 1999).
9
Major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for one’s self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working. 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(I) (1991). Specific exclusions from the category of major life activities
include:
temporary physical or mental impairments, current illegal dug use,
homosexuality and bisexuality, sexual behavior disorders, predisposition to illness,
personality traits, environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage, advanced age,
pregnancy. A major life activity is “substantially limited” within the meaning of the
statute if the individual is unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in
the general population can perform, or is significantly restricted as to the condition,
manner, or duration under which he or she can perform the activity, as compared to the
general population. 29 C.F.R.§ 1630.2(J).
10
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
11
See Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category of
Disability Anti Discrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 8-23 (1999) (describing
historical concepts of disabilities and outlining current case law interpreting disabilities
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that no employer “shall discriminate against a qualified individual with
a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
12
conditions, and privileges of employment.”
In addition to those
traditional forms of discrimination based on the provisions of Title VII,
Title I contains an additional form of discrimination — ”not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant
or employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
13
the business.”
Despite intense interest in the ADA and its clearly stated goals of
providing strong, consistent, and enforceable standards for ending
discrimination and fostering economic and social inclusion, there is no
consistent understanding of the reasonable accommodation requirement.
Indeed, there are at least three distinct distributive outcomes that appear
to comport with the requirements of the ADA.
A. Shifting Costs
Although the ADA is not the first civil rights legislation to use the
14
it invested reasonable
concept of reasonable accommodation,
accommodation with significant and far-reaching meaning. For that
reason, the ADA is thought to go farther than traditional civil rights laws
because it requires employers to do more than simply treat individuals
with disabilities the same way as other similarly qualified applicants or
workers. Indeed, the ADA imposes on employers an obligation to
under ADA).
12
42 U.S.C § 12112(a) (1994).
13
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
14
Prior to the ADA, “reasonable accommodation” had been used in two, very different
contexts. Reasonable accommodation is used in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
which applies to schools and housing providers receiving federal assistance. 29 U.S.C. §
794 (1994). Reasonable accommodation is also used in the context of Title VII’s prohibition
on discrimination on the basis of religion. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) (1988). In TWA v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the court interpreted 2000e(j) as no more than de minimis cost to
employer and severely restricted the application of the law to avoid conflict with the First
Amendment prohibition against establishing religion. See also Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The
Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second Generation Civil Rights
Statute, 26 HARV. C.R. – C.L. L. REV. 413, 511-14 (1991) (discussing different interpretations
of “reasonable accommodations” for religion and disability). The legislature, in the context
of the ADA, specifically rejected the latter interpretation. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 68
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350.
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provide reasonable accommodation to make it possible for people with
disabilities to perform essential job functions and to secure equal
enjoyment of all terms and conditions of employment. This obligation
applies whether or not there is a finding of prior wrongful conduct. In
that sense, the reasonable accommodation requirement shifts the costs of
15
accommodation from the employee to the employer.
As defined by the ADA, reasonable accommodation is a flexible,
interactive, and personalized process. Reasonable accommodation may
include “making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible
to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and job restructuring, parttime, or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate
adjustment or modifications of examination, training materials or
policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other
16
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.”
Indeed,
there have been significant court decisions ruling that reasonable
accommodation includes such changes as specialized testing, training or
17
other work procedures, provision of specialized equipment or other

15
This process might more accurately be called re-shifting, as costs first were shifted
from individuals with disabilities to the federal government through various entitlement
programs, and then shifted to employers through operation of the ADA. An estimated
$200 billion dollars a year in government expenditures support people with disabilities.
See Sen. Tom Harkin, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Four Years Later - Commentary on
Blanck, 79 IOWA L. REV. 935, 937 (1994) (quoting former President Bush’s observation that it
costs American people nearly $200 billion annually to support people with disabilities).
16
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994).
17
See, e.g., Vollmert v. Wisconsin Dept. of Transp., 197 F.3d 293, 302 (7th Cir. 1999)
(finding that under ADA, employer did not reasonably accommodate learning disabilities
that interfered with employee’s ability to master new computer system when it provided
her with training on new system, where employer was aware of her disabilities, was made
specifically aware of need for specialized training by physician’s letter, and yet refused to
provide training sufficiently designed to address her disability, and refused her request for
tutor trained in learning disabilities after she indicated that tutor likely was available free
of charge through government agency); Meisser v. Hove, 872 F. Supp. 507, 509 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (ordering employer to provide the deaf plaintiff with, among other things, speech
therapy, further job opportunities which would enhance his skills to compete meaningfully
for future positions, and to provide professional evaluations of his speech); Arneson v.
Sullivan, 946 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1991) (ordering employer to reinstate employee to his
position of claims representative and to provide him with computer training on new
computer system); American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, Local 51 v. Baker, 677 F. Supp. 636
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (ordering employer, United States Mint, to provide accommodation,
including specialized training, job restructuring, reassignment, and special equipment, as
well as individualized accommodations including training which reflected slower paced
presentation of instructions, modeling, verbal and/or physical prompts, and repetition, as
well as assisting devices such as gloves, rubber tips, magnifying glasses, and equipment to
make lifting and carrying easier); Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666, 669 (11th Cir. 1983)
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physical modifications of the workplace, and job restructuring. The
employer may choose the type of accommodation, with no obligation to
make the most efficacious or best accommodation possible or every
accommodation required, as long as the accommodation made enables
(holding that when employer utilizes test to determine applicant’s eligibility for position,
handicapped applicant must be accommodated by use of test that accurately reflects
handicapped applicant’s abilities). But see Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190
F.3d 1, 9 (2d Cir. 1999) (school district not required under ADA to retrain and assign
disabled head custodian to entirely different position, such as courier or bus dispatcher,
which positions were not available at relevant time); Needle v. Alling & Cory, Inc., 88 F.
Supp. 2d 100 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding employer has no obligation to retrain disabled
employee for position for which he is not qualified).
18
See e.g., Davis v. Lockheed Martin Operations Support, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d (D. Md.
2000) (finding reasonable under ADA former employer’s six-week schedule, by which
former employee with disabling entrapment of certain nerves, which caused her pain in
groin and upper thigh, would gradually increase her hours back to 40-hour week, and
employer’s installation of ergonomic chair, adjustable workstations, elevated computer
table, and cot); Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Admin., 851 F. Supp. 353 (W.D. Wis.
1994), aff’d 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that employer had adequately
accommodated plaintiff by making several modifications to a kitchenette when
constructing new facilities for plaintiff’s department); Fink v. New York City Dep’t of Pers.,
53 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that employer sufficiently accommodated visually
impaired candidates for promotion by providing them with tape recording of examination,
tape recorder, reader-assistant to help with operation of recorder and to read questions and
answers, private room, and double time afforded to other candidates); Davis v. York Int’l,
Inc., 1993 WL 524761, *8 (D. Md.) (finding as reasonable accommodation employer’s
providing computer equipment at employee’s home in order to allow her to complete her
work, because her Multiple Sclerosis caused her to become increasingly distracted when in
office environment).
19
See, e.g., Santiago v. Executive Airlines, 41 F. Supp. 2d 129, 136-37 (D.P.R. 1999)
(finding that airline’s reassignment of employee with ear condition from flight attendant to
ramp escort position, rather than granting employee’s request to fly only in pressurized
aircraft, was a reasonable accommodation under ADA); Karsbusicky v. City of Park Ridge,
950 F. Supp. 878, 884-85 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding reassignment of police officer with
congenital total hearing loss in left ear to a community service officer position to be
reasonable accommodation); Hennenfent v. Mid Dakota Clinic, 164 F.3d 419, 422 (8th Cir.
1998) (finding clinic extended reasonable accommodation within meaning of ADA to
physician for leg amputation resulting from diabetes, where it provided him with reduced
work schedules, extended leaves of absence, and backup physicians to assist him with his
on-call duties); Schwertfager v. City of Boyton Beach, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364-65 (S.D. Fla.
1999) (finding city provided employee who had breast cancer and reconstructive surgery
ample accommodations to achieve qualifications required to perform essential functions of
her position, and thus, employee did not establish prima facie case under ADA; employee
was provided assistance and training, and was paid her full salary for extended period of
time after her surgery, and even after she was reassigned to position of less responsibility,
she retained her title and salary, though her job functions were greatly reduced); cf.
Norville v. State Island University Hosp., 196 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1999) (reassignment does not
constitute reasonable accommodation under the ADA where a position comparable to the
employee’s former placement is available, for which the employee is qualified, but the
employee instead is assigned to a position that would involve a significant diminution in
salary, benefits, seniority and other advantages that she possessed in her former job).
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the employee to perform the essential job functions and provides the
employee with employment benefits equivalent to those of other
20
employees.
The apparent breadth of the ADA’s reasonable accommodation
standard is bounded by the undue hardship defense. “Undue hardship”
is defined broadly as an action requiring significant difficulty or expense
when considered in light of such factors as the nature and cost of the
accommodation needed, the overall financial resources of the facility
involved or of the employer, the type of operation or operations of the
21
employer, and potential disruption to other workers and the
22
production process.
Prior to its passage in 1990, the ADA was “greeted with enthusiasm by
people with disabilities who expected it to produce a noticeable
expansion of employment opportunities, and with enormous concern by
employers who fear that its requirement to accommodate workers’
23
disabilities will dramatically increase costs directly or via litigation.”
Despite the promise of the ADA, this has not proven to be true.
Although there have been significant court decisions ruling that
reasonable accommodation includes such changes as specialized testing,
training or other work procedures, provision of specialized equipment or
other physical modifications of the workplace, and job restructuring,
available data indicates that people with disabilities are failing to achieve
a noticeable expansion of employment opportunities. Although there is
no way of discerning the number or frequency of individual acts of
discrimination against people with disabilities, post-ADA research has
“consistently demonstrated that people with disabilities have lower
average wages and employment rates than individuals without
24
disabilities.”
The concern that the reasonable accommodation requirement would
dramatically increase costs of employing people with disabilities also
appears largely unfounded. Although the size of the financial burden on
employers as a result of the reasonable accommodation requirement is
not clear, a review of the available data suggests that the majority of

20

See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1995).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994).
22
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) (1993).
23
Nancy R. Mudrick, Employment Discrimination Laws of Disability: Utilization and
Outcome, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 53, 54 (1997).
24
Marjorie Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve its Employment Goals?, 549 ANNALS AM. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 41-42 (1997).
21
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accommodations cost less than $100 per employee. In fact, the direct
costs of accommodation of workers with disabilities may be even lower,
as many companies regularly make informal accommodations that
require minor and cost-free workplace adjustments and that may enable
employees with and without disabilities to perform jobs productively,
26
cost-effectively, and safely.
B. Sharing Costs
One important substantive goal of the ADA is to encourage parties to
share information held by the person with a disability, such as his or her
specific limitations and abilities, and the information held by the
employer, such as the essential functions of the job and the feasibility of
various reasonable accommodations, in negotiations over possible
27
accommodations.
Indeed, several courts have held that employees
must inform their employer of their disability in order to trigger the duty
to accommodate and reveal medical information necessary for devising
28
an accommodation, and that the employer has a duty to confer with

25
A 1994 report from the President’s Committee on Employment of People with
Disabilities found that since October 1992, 68% of the accommodations made for workers
with disabilities cost $500 or less. See Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line:
Determining When an Employer’s Financial Hardship Becomes “Undue” Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 394 n.11 (1995). Materials in the ADA’s
legislative history indicate costs to businesses for reasonable accommodations are expected
to be less than $100 per worker for 30% of workers needing an accommodation, with 50%
of those needing an accommodation requiring no expense at all. S. REP. NO. 116 (1989). A
study commissioned by Sears, Roebuck, and Co. indicated that 69% of the reasonable
accommodations provided by the company cost nothing, 28% cost less than $1,000, and
only 3% cost more than $1,000. Moreover, the average cost to Sears of providing workplace
accommodations to employees with disabilities was less than $50, compared with an
average cost of $1,800 and $2,400 for terminating and replacing an employee, respectively.
See Peter David Blanck, Transcending Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Report on
Sears, Roebuck and Co., 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 278, 279 (1996). A 1982
Department of Labor study finding only 22% of individuals with disabilities received any
form of accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act, and of that group 51% of the
accommodations imposed no costs and 30% imposed a cost of less than $500 per worker.
See Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV.
923, 930 (1989).
26
Blanck, supra note 25, at 379-80.
27
Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L. J. 1 (1996).
28
See, e.g. Barnett v. U.S. Air, 228 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000); Taylor v. Phoenixville
School Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d Cir. 1999); Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut, 188 F.3d 944, 951 (8th
Cir. 1999); Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, 70 F.3d 667, 677 (1st Cir. 1995); Smith v. Midland
Brake, 180 F.3d 1154, 1171-72 (10th Cir. 1999); 125 F.3d 1432, 1434-36 (11th Cir. 1997); Taylor
v. Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d 155, 163-65 (5th Cir. 1996).
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individuals with disabilities over requested accommodations.
Pamela S. Karlan and George Rutherglen assert that the structure of
the reasonable accommodation and undue hardship doctrines operates
30
to create a zone of bargaining. Because compensatory and punitive
damages are available to the individual with a disability only upon proof
31
of lack of good faith effort to accommodate on the part of the employer,
it is likely that employers will offer some accommodation. The potential
plaintiff also faces a substantial risk in the courts. Thus the potential
litigant must carefully weigh the potential return from litigation against
the value of the job with the presumably lesser level of accommodation
offered.
The result is a bargaining range, where the minimum the individual
with a disability is willing to accept is less than the maximum the
employer is willing to offer. Karlan and Rutherglen conclude:
The relatively low cost of many modifications, the safe harbor
against damages provided to employers who negotiated in good
faith and the risks attendant on litigation all make it likely that
employers will offer accommodations. At the same time, the
relatively high search costs and dislocation expenses faced by many
disabled individuals make it likely that they will accept the
employer’s proffered accommodation, even if it is far from perfect.
In these cases, employer and employee essentially share the costs of

29

See, e.g. Jackan v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 205 F.3d 562, 566 (2d Cir. 2000);
Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000); Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 951;
Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1112; Phoenixville School Dist., 184 F.3d at 311; Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at
1171-72; EEOC v. Prevo’s Family Market, 135 F.3d 1089, 1095 (6th Cir. 1998); 125 F.3d at
1134; Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d at 165; Beck v. Univ. Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130,
1135 (7th Cir. 1996); Cyanamid Plastics, 70 F.3d at 677.
30
Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 27, at 30; see also Richard V. Burkhauser, The
American With Disabilities Act: Social Contract or Special Privilege; Post-ADA; Are People With
Disabilities Expected to Work?, 549 ANNALS 71, 79 (1997) (“When a pathology begins to affect
the ability to work, important job related decisions must be made by both worker and
employee. These decisions may also be influenced by government policies. The worker
will consider the relative rewards of continued work versus applying for transfer benefits.
In like manner, the social institutions and legal mandates within which the firm must
operate will influence an employer’s willingness to accommodate the work.”).
31
The remedies available under the ADA are the same as those available under Title
VII. Before an individual can file a lawsuit, he or she must file a charge with the EEOC
and/or the relevant state agency and receive a right-to-sue letter. The remedies for
violation of Title I include injunctive relief, back pay, job reinstatement, attorney’s fees, and
compensatory and punitive damages in the case of intentional discrimination. Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, compensatory and punitive damages are based on the size of the
employer, and the maximum amounts range from $50,000 to $300,000. See 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(b)(3) (1994).
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32

C. Avoiding Costs
In the employment context, the ADA prohibits an employer from
discriminating on the basis of disability against a qualified individual
with a disability in regard to, among other things, fringe benefits
33
including employer-sponsored pension and welfare benefits. One such
benefit is employee participation in an employer-sponsored disability
34
benefits plan.
Disability benefit plans provide income–replacement benefits to
employees who are unable to work because of illness or accident. The
purpose of such an insurance plan, which may be either employersponsored or privately purchased, is to replace some or all of the income
lost when an employee is suffering from a disability, as defined by the
policy at issue. There are two general types of definitions of disability in
ERISA-regulated plans. The first defines disability as the employee’s
35
inability to perform the material duties of her own occupation. The
second type defines disability as the employee’s inability to perform any
occupation or, more narrowly, any occupation for which she is suited by
36
education, training, or experience. Frequently, plans incorporate both

32

Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 27, at 30.
See 29 C.F.R § 1630.4(f) (1993).
34
Employer-sponsored disability insurance plans may be either short-term or longterm in nature. Under a short-term plan an employee receives a portion of her regular
wages for a specified period of disability generally not to exceed 26 weeks. Long-term
benefit coverage usually starts after short-term disability income benefits cease. Long-term
benefit coverage provides a partial income replacement benefit to employees who are not
likely to return to work because of the total and/or permanent nature of their disabilities.
35
See, e.g., Lown v. Continental Cas. Co., 238 F.3d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 2001)
(“continuously unable to perform the substantial and material duties of his regular
occupation . . .and under the regular care of a licensed physician other than himself”);
Glover v. Smith Central Bell Tel. Co., 644 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1980) (“unable to
substantially perform all of the material acts of his particular job in the usual and
contemporary way”); Mizzell v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1016,1020 (C.D.
Cal. 2000) (“unable to perform the important duties of his own occupation on a full-time or
part-time basis because of an injury or sickness that started while insured under [the]
policy”); Hughes v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 112 F. Supp. 2d 780, 782-783 (S.D. Ind.
2000) (“unable to perform all the material duties of his regular occupation”); Gonyea v.
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 812 F. Supp. 445, 446 n.1 (D. Vt. 1993) (“able to perform
none of the usual and customary duties of your occupation”); Brassord v. Continental Cas.
Co., 630 F. Supp. 951, 955 (D. Conn. 1986) (“completely unable to perform each and every
duty of your occupation because of accidental bodily injury or disease”).
36
See, e.g., Myers v. Hercules, 253 F.3d 761, 766 (4th Cir. 2001) (“not able to engage in
any employment for wage or profit for which [she is] reasonably qualified by training,
33
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definitions in a two-phase structure, with an initial “own occupation”
stage of between one and two years, and a continuing “any occupation”
37
Typically, employees
phase lasting until normal retirement age.

education, or experience”); Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 333 (7th Cir.
2000) (“whether the applicant is unable to perform the duties of the job for which he is
reasonably fitted by his training or experience”); Hammond v. Fidelity and Guard. Life Ins.
Co., 965 F.2d 428,431 (7th Cir. 1992) (“unable to perform all of the substantial and material
acts necessary to the prosecution of some gainful business or occupation”); Rendulic v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 326, 329 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (“unable to
do any work for pay or profit for which [he or she] is or could become reasonably qualified
by education, training, or experience”); Andrews v. Standard Ins. Co., 2000 WL 549466, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“is unable to perform with reasonable continuity the material duties of
any gainful occupation for which [he is] reasonably fitted by education, training or
experience”); Eriksen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 2d 864, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1999)
(“not be able to engage in any type of work”); Torimino v. United Food and Commercial
Workers Intern. Union Industry Pension Fund, 548 F. Supp. 1012, 1014 (E.D. Mo. 1982)
(“[the employee] has been totally disabled by bodily injury or disease so as to be prevented
from engaging in any further employment except for such employment or gainful pursuit
at which he is unable to earn more than $100 per month . . . [s]uch disability will be
permanent and will continue during the remainder of his life”).
37
See, e.g., Aboul-Fetouh v. Employee Benefits Committee, 245 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir.
2001) (“during the Elimination Period and for the next twenty-four (24) months, the
Member is prevented by Disability from doing all the material and substantial duties of his
own occupation. After that, “Totally Disabled” means that the Member is prevented by
such Disability from doing any occupation or work for which he is or could become
qualified by training, education, or experience”); Schindler v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
141 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1075 n.2 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“unable to perform the material duties of
your regular occupation . . . during the next 12 consecutive months, whether or not the
monthly benefits are paid for each of these months. Thereafter, you must be totally
incapable due to illness or injury from performing the material duties of any gainful
occupation for which you are reasonably fit in training, education or experience.”);
Demyan v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
(“in a continuous state of incapacity due to illness which 1. while it continues through the
Elimination Period and during the following 36 months of incapacity, prevents him from
performing the material and substantial duties of his regular occupation, and 2. while it
continues thereafter, prevents him from performing the material and substantial duties of
any occupation for which he is or becomes qualified by education, training or experience”);
Archible v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1205 (S.D. Ala. S. Div. 2000)
(“During the first 24 months of your disability, in addition to your Qualifying Period, you
must be unable to perform the normal duties of your regular occupation for any employer
and you must at no time engage in any occupation or employment for pay or profit. This
must be due to your disability. . . After the first 24 months of your disability, in addition to
your Qualifying Disability Period, you must be completely unable to engage in any
occupation or employment for which you are or become qualified. You could be qualified
because of your education, training or experience.”); Hotaling v. Teachers Ins. and Annuity
Ass’n of America, 62 F. Supp. 2d 731,739 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (“(a) For the first thirty months of
Disability, being completely unable due to sickness, bodily injury, or pregnancy to perform
your normal occupation and not performing any other occupation; and (b) after the first
thirty months, being unable due to sickness, bodily injury, or pregnancy to perform any
occupation for which you are reasonably suited by education, training, or experience”);
Sova v. Wheaton Franciscan Services, Inc. Health and Welfare Ben. Trust, 40 F. Supp. 2d
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applying for disability benefits are required by the terms of the plan to
38
submit sufficient objective medical evidence of their disabilities.
Most employee-sponsored welfare plans, including disability benefits
plans, are governed by ERISA. ERISA was enacted to encourage
employer formation of and to protect employees’ rights to pension plans
and welfare benefits plans by requiring uniformity in the administration
of benefits plans. It contains a broad preemption clause, that preempts
39
state law insofar as it “relates to” employee benefit plans, and provides
the exclusive remedial scheme for claims relating to employee benefits
40
plans.
Unfortunately, ERISA-regulated disability benefits and the structure of
ERISA’s remedial scheme can be used by employers to avoid the duty of
reasonable accommodation of employees with disabilities. Consider an
employee who experiences a disability but remains willing and able to
41
work with some accommodation.
She notifies her employer of the
disability. Depending on her familiarity with the ADA and/or the

1031, 1033 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (“the complete inability of the participant, due to injury and/or
illness, to perform all the important daily duties of his regular occupation for a twenty-four
(24) month period beginning from the date of the disablement. For any period extending
beyond an initial twenty-four (24) month period, total disability means the complete
inability of the participant to perform the important daily duties of any occupation for
which the participant may be or may become qualified for by any reason of education
and/or training and/or experience”); Peterson v. Continental Cas. Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 532,
535 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“during [the first 24 months] . . . continuously unable to perform the
substantial and material duties of Your regular occupation. . . [after 24 months]
continuously unable to engage in any occupation for which You are or become qualified by
education, training or experience”).
38
See Wojciechowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2001 WL 38264, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan.
12, 2001); Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de Mours and Co., 268 F.3d 167, 171-72 (3d Cir. 2001);
Myers, 253 F.3d at 763; Gooden v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 250 F.3d 329, 331 (5th
Cir. 2001); Delta Family Care Disability and Survivorship Plan v. Marshall, 258 F.3d 834,
837-38 (8th Cir. 2001); Walke v. Group Long Term Disability Ins., 256 F.3d 835, 838 (8th Cir.
2001); Regula v. Delta Family Care Disability and Survivorship Plan, 266 F.3d 1130, 1133
(9th Cir. 2001); Levinson v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir.
2001); Pari-Fasano v. ITT Hartford Life and Acc. Ins., 230 F.3d 415, 417-18 (1st Cir. 2000);
Postma v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 223 F.3d 533 (7th Cir. 2000); Cochran v. Trans-General
Life Ins. Co., 60 F. Supp. 2d 693, 695 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
39
The “Preemption Clause” provides, “[e]xcept as provided in [the Savings
Clause] . . .[ERISA shall] supercede any and all state laws insofar as they may not or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). The “Savings
Clause” exempts state insurance, banking and securities law from preemption. 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(2)(A). However, self-funded employee welfare plans cannot be deemed insurance
plans under the “Deemer Clause”. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994).
40
29 U.S.C. § 1132.
41
This discussion does not address workers who claim they have a record of a
substantially limiting impairment, or are regarded has having such impairment.
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feasibility of various potential accommodations, she may or may not
request accommodation of her disability from her employer. Imagine
that the employer is either unaware of the necessity for, or is unwilling
or unable to provide, accommodation for the employee, and instead
suggests, encourages, or forces our employee to leave the workplace on
temporary or permanent disability leave. Because employer-sponsored
disability plans rarely define disability with reference to reasonable
42
accommodation, it is entirely possible that the employee may receive
disability benefits even though she is able to perform her job with
reasonable accommodation. As a result, our employee falls into a gap
between the definition of disability contained in her employer’s
disability leave policy and the definition of disability contained in the
ADA.
Although a plaintiff seeking or receiving disability benefits under an
employee disability benefits plan, based on proof that the plaintiff is
unable to work, is not necessarily barred from simultaneously
contending that her employer discriminated against her under the
43
ADA, once our employee is placed on disability her standing to assert
the rights created by the ADA is jeopardized. In order to have standing
to challenge an employer-provided disability insurance policy as
discriminatory under the ADA, a plaintiff must be a “qualified
individual with a disability,” defined as “an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual
44
holds or desires.” At least four Circuits have found that a disabled
former employee is not a qualified individual with a disability as defined
by the ADA and therefore does not have standing to sue her ex45
employer under Title I.
In the alternative, if the disabled former

42
See Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp, 526 U.S. 795, 803 (1999) (the
definition of “individual with a disability” for purposes of Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) benefits does not take the possibility of reasonable accommodation into
account).
43
See Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. at 802-03 (holding that claims for
SSDI benefits and for ADA damages do not inherently conflict). For a discussion of this
issue, see generally Maureen C. Weston, The Road Best Traveled: Removing Judicial Roadblocks
that Prevent Workers from Obtaining Both Disability Benefits and ADA Civil Rights Protection, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377 (1997).
44
42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1994) (“For the purposes of this sub-chapter, consideration shall
be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an
employer has prepared a written job description before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential
functions of the job.”).
45
The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have found that a disabled former
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employee is able to get her case into court as a claim under ERISA, she
46
will most likely face a bench trial governed by an arbitrary and
47
capricious standard of review and limited to the evidence in the

employee is not a “qualified individual with a disability,” and therefore lacks standing to
sue his or her former employer under the ADA. See Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., Ret. Plan
of the Pillsbury Co., 268 F.3d 456, 457-99 (7th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Co., 96 F.3d
1039, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1996); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104,
1109 (9th Cir. 2000); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 186-87 (6th Cir. 1996)
rev’d on other grounds, 121 F.3d 1006, 1008-09 (6th Cir. 1997); Gonzales v. Garner Food
Services, Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Bass v. City of Orlando, 57 F. Supp.
2d 1318, 1323 (M.D. Fla. 1999); Fitts v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 44 F. Supp. 2d 317, 321
(D.D.C. 1999); Fennell v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 37 F. Supp. 2d 40, 43 (D.D.C. 1999); Beatty v.
City of Wheaton, 1999 WL 91909, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 1999); Erwin v. Northwestern Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1227, 1230 (S.D. Ind. 1998), Fobar v. City of Dearborn Heights,
994 F. Supp. 878, 882 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Bril v. Dean Witter, Discover & Co., 986 F. Supp
171, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Neither the EEOC regulation nor the interpretive guidance
address the standing issue. The EEOC has taken the position in litigation that a former
employee has standing to sue under the ADA so long as he or she is qualified to receive
benefits. See Stephen F. Befort, Mental Illness and Long-Term Disability Plans Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 287, 293 (1999) (citing Leonard F. v.
Israel Discount Bank of New York, No. 95 Civ. 6964, 1996 WL 634860, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
24, 1996)).
Nor may the employee bring suit against the insurance provider of a long-term
disability benefit policy as a “public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA. See
Weyer, 198 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612
(3rd Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, 121 F.3d 1006, 1011 (6th Cir. 1997). But
see Conners v. Maine Medical Center, 46 F. Supp. 2d 34, (D. Me. 1999).
46
The majority of the Circuits have held that there is no statutory right to a jury trial in
an action for benefits under ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1994). See Katsaros v. Cody, 744
F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1984); Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1990); Berry v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1985); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir.
1980); Bair v. General Motors Corp., 895 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 1990); Wardle v. Central States,
Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980); Smith v. City of
Des Moines Iowa, 99 F.3d 1466 (8th Cir. 1996), Nevill v. Shell Oil Co., 835 F.2d 209 (9th Cir.
1987); Zimmerman v. Sloss Equipment, Inc., 72 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 1996); Broaddus v.
Florida Power Corp., 145 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 1998).
47
In 1989, the Supreme Court held that the standard for review of an ERISA-regulated
benefits decision is determined by the terms of the plan  the standard is de novo, unless
the benefits plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan in which case the standard of
review is abuse of discretion. Firestone v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). Although the plan
must properly designate a delegate of the fiduciary’s discretionary authority, see
Rodriquez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 986 F.2d 580, 584 (1st Cir. 1993), no
“magic words” are required to confer discretion. See DeNobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d
1180, 1187 (4th Cir. 1989). Courts appear to require language which specifically states
“discretion to determine questions regarding benefits eligibility.” Jordan v. Ret. Comm. of
Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 46 F.3d 1264 (2d Cir. 1995); Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
113 F.3d 433 (3d Cir. 1997); Haley v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 84, 88-89 (4th Cir.
1996); Patterson v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 11 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1993). There is an exception
for situations where the decisionmaker is operating under a conflict of interest. Firestone,
489 U.S. at 115. What is required to demonstrate a conflict of interest as well as the effect of
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48

administrative record.

II. DEFINING DISABILITY: AN ALTERNATIVE MEDICAL MODEL
One reason for the inconsistent outcomes identified above is the
failure to develop a coherent and consistent theory of disability. Indeed,
“[o]ne of the most contentious aspects of disability law, research, and
49
policy involves the definition of disability.”
In many respects, the
courts have treated the ADA as a straightforward extension of traditional
civil rights protections to people with disabilities. However, theoretical
treatment of the ADA is less common than that afforded other civil
rights statutes, and disability remains undertheorized — ”[c]ompared
with the enormous volume of literature about race and gender, little
50
attention has been paid to the theoretical understanding of disability.”
51
Moreover, although the ADA is modeled on Title VII, authors have
correctly noted that the indiscriminate reliance on Title VII as a
precedent directs attention away from the distinctiveness of the ADA
and the important task of developing a theory of disability and
52
disability-based discrimination.

a conflict of interest remain the subject of litigation. See What Standard of Review Applies
When the Decision Maker Has a Conflict of Interest (Part I), ERISA LITIGATION ALERT, Mar.
2000, at 11; Alan P. Woodruff, What Standard of Review Applies When the Decision Maker Has a
Conflict of Interest (Part II), ERISA LITIGATION ALERT, Apr. 2000, at 1.
48
In a case governed by the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the circuit
courts are uniform in holding that a court is allowed to consider only the evidence
presented to the decisionmaker at the time of the decision. See generally Bernstein v.
Capitalcare, Inc., 70 F.3d 783 (4th Cir. 1995); Donato v. MetLife, 19 F. 3d 375 (7th Cir 1994);
Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1993); Miller v. MetLife,
925 F.2d 979 (6th Cir. 1991); Oldenberger v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas
Teamsters Pension Fund, 934 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1991); Winters v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
49 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 1995); Sandoval v. Aetna Life and Cas. Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377 (10th Cir.
1992); Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 890 F.2d 1137 (11th Cir. 1990).
49
Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the Employment
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 352 (1997).
50
Francis & Silvers, supra note 5, at xxiv.
51
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. III, at 26, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 449 (1990).
52
See, e.g., S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why
Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603 (2001); Steven L. Wilborn, A Nested
Model of Discrimination, www.legalessays.com (1999); see also Stephen Befort & Holly
Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial Dissonance, the Supreme Court’s Response
and, the Future of Disability Discrimination Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 68 (1999); Bonnie P.
Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST.
L.J. 335 (2001) [hereinafter Tucker, Revolving Door].
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A. The Traditional Medical Model of Disability
1. The History: A Progression of Models of Disability
More than a decade ago, political scientist Richard Scotch identified a
series of theoretical paradigms to explain how disability has been
conceptualized historically in Western society: the moral model, the
medical model, the economic model, the social model, and the civil
53
rights model.
The earliest model, the moral model, interprets disability as a
54
reflection of sinfulness and inner spiritual inferiority.
Although
55
vestiges of the moral model remain in modern disability policy, for
more than one hundred years, “disability has been defined in
predominantly medical terms as a chronic functional incapacity whose
consequence was functional limitations assumed to result from physical
56
or mental impairment.”
The defining characteristic of the medical
model is the view that disability is an individual, personal trait of the
57
person in whom it inheres.
The disabled individual is viewed as
58
innately biologically different and inferior. According to this model,
59
the disabled individual’s problem lies in the impairment. Consequently,
the best way to help the disabled person is to use either medicine to cure
or ameliorate the impairment, or rehabilitation techniques to enable the
60
person to cope with or overcome the impairment’s effects. Under the
medical model, “society allocates to physicians the authority to validate
the existence of the disability and thus to provide an individual with

53

See Scotch, supra note 3, at 214.
Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of
Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1345-46
(1993).
55
For example, the ADA appears to contain vestiges of the moral model as illegal drug
use, 42 U.S.C. § 12210 (1994); homosexuality, bisexuality, and transvestitism, 42 U.S.C. §
12211(a)(b)(1) (1994); and compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania, (b)(2) are
excluded from the definition of disabled.
56
Id. “This model assumed that the primary problem faced by people with disabilities
was the incapacity to work and otherwise participate in society. It further assumed that
such incapacity was the natural product of their impairments, and to some extent their own
‘secondary’ psychological reactions to their impairments.” Scotch, supra note 3, at 214; see
also Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 649 (1999)
(defining medical model).
57
Crossley supra note 56, at 649-50.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 650.
60
Id.
54
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access to whatever social assistance may be available to disabled
61
persons.”
62
The economic model arose after the advent of World War II, and
views disability as a “phenomenon that lies at the intersection of human
63
impairment and the market for labor.”
The economic model views
disability as the limiting effect imposed on individuals’ functional
capacity and is assessed according to how much it restricts people from
64
performing the primary or essential activities of their work. The
economic model is intended to promote the economic self-sufficiency of
individuals with disabilities by increasing their participation in
65
compensated labor.
In stark contrast to the medical model, the social model of disability
66
sees disadvantages as flowing from social systems and structures. A
major premise of this model is that disability is a social construct, rather
67
than a biological phenomenon.
Thus, the disadvantaged status of
persons with disabilities is the product of a hostile or inhospitable social
68
environment, not simply the product of bodily defects. Another
important premise of the social model is that disability may also be a
69
cultural construct.
Stereotypical depictions of disabled persons
perpetuate social prejudices and bolster the non-disabled person’s fear of
70
disabled persons. Thus, the barriers embedded in social structures and
71
attitudes also construct disability. A corollary of the belief that
disability is a social construct is the view that normalcy itself is also a
72
social construct.
From the social model grew the civil rights model, based largely on the
73
civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Under this model, the

61

Id.
Berg, supra note 11, at 8.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Crossley, supra note 56, at 653.
67
Id. at 654.
68
Id. An example of how construction of physical environments can create disability is
the construction of buildings with stairs, rather than elevators or ramps.
69
Id. at 655.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 656.
72
Id. The fundamental shortcoming of the social model is that by focusing on
environmentally caused disadvantages; it ignores limitations inherent in bodily
impairments.
73
Drimmer, supra note 54, at 1355.
62
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legal and social status of disabled persons reflects underlying social
74
attitudes and assumptions concerning disability. Above all, the civil
rights model seeks to “unmask the false objectivity that allows society to
label some of its members ‘disabled’ and treat those citizens as less than
75
equal.” “In seeking appropriate remedies, the civil rights model adopts
76
three goals from the civil rights movement of other minority groups.”
The first goal is to eradicate perceptions of inferiority and all other
77
irrational reactions. The second goal is to eliminate discrimination that
78
Finally, the model “pursues a ‘level
results from such prejudices.
playing field,’” or equality of opportunity, by aggressively securing
79
access to, and independence in, all aspects of society.”
2. The Present: Centrality of a Traditional Medical Model
One distinct feature of disability is that it has been linked with
concepts of health, disease, and illness in U.S. disability policy. As Paula
Berg has observed, “the definition of disability in antidiscrimination law
is part of a larger cultural discourse that establishes and upholds
dominant notions of health, illness, and disability while imposing a
particular set of expectations upon individuals deemed to occupy each
80
class.”
Early disability-based welfare programs medicalized disability,
81
defining it as an exclusively individual and clinical concept. The ADA
is generally thought to embody the social and civil rights models of
82
disability. However, “[d]espite the civil rights intent of this bill, and the

74

Id.
Id. at 1355-56.
76
Id. at 1358.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 1358.
80
Berg, supra note 11, at 4.
81
See, e.g., DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE (1984) (the disability category as
an administrative category in the welfare state, and use of medical certification as the core
administrative mechanism for defining the disability category).
82
See Tucker, Revolving Door, supra note 52, at 340 (“[t]he ADA purports to be a civil
rights law; it was premised on the concept of civil rights for individuals with disabilities”);
Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY. J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 19, 31 (2000) (“[t]he ADA explicitly adopts a civil rights approach to the problems
that people with disabilities encounter in the workplace”); Matthew Diller, Dissonant
Disability Policies: The Tension Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal
Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1998) (“[t]he ADA is premised on the
recognition that barriers to full participation are socially created, rather than the inevitable
consequence of medical impairments. It establishes the principle that the inclusion of
75
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findings and purposes which recognize widespread discrimination, the
medical and social pathology treatment of disability is seemingly
83
Indeed, current ADA jurisprudence suggests a
inescapable.”
recommitment to a narrow and individualistic biomedical model as the
84
primary understanding of disability. In each of the recent trilogy of
85
86
ADA cases on standing, Sutton v. United Airlines, Murphy v. UPS, and
87
Albertson’s v. Kirkingburg, the Supreme Court focused on the objective,
biomedical nature of the plaintiffs’ alleged impairments, and whether or
88
not they represented a substantial personal loss of capacities.
The
Court’s restrictive category of disability “reflects and reinforces the
notion that disability is an objective biomedical phenomenon that
89
constitutes an essential aspect of the individual.”
Disability also remains undertheorized, in particular the integration of
90
health-related and socially-created or -constructed aspects of disability.
These two aspects are not necessarily in conflict — we recognize that
“impairment is not ‘natural,’ but a historically changing category”
91
without denying its materiality.
Even assuming that disability is
largely socially-created or -constructed, we know little about the nature
of disability apart from those social forces. In other words, “[a]fter the

people with disabilities into all aspects of society is a civil right.”).
83
Drimmer, supra note 54, at 1399.
84
See, e.g., Berg, supra note 11, at 13 (“[d]espite its centrality to anti-discrimination law,
courts largely eschewed the socio-political perspective when determining whether a
plaintiff claiming discrimination is disabled and therefore entitled to legal protection.
Instead, they have remained firmly entrenched in an essentialist biomedical understanding
of disability, which has resulted in the fabrication of an extremely narrow category of
disability”).
85
527 U.S. 471 (1999).
86
527 U.S. 516 (1999).
87
527 U.S. 555 (1999).
88
There is also evidence that the court’s analysis of the “regarded as” disabled cases
also demonstrates a return to a traditional medical model of disability. Berg asserts that, in
these cases, courts have improperly grafted the actual disability analysis — whether
plaintiff’s impairment substantially limits one or more of his major life activities — onto the
“regarded as” prong. In other words, courts have held that to be “regarded as” disabled
within the meaning of the ADA, the defendant must falsely perceive that the impairment
substantially limits one or more of the plaintiff’s major life functions.
Simply
demonstrating that the defendant discriminated on the basis of a real or imagined physical
or mental impairment, even when plaintiff’s condition is widely stigmatized, is insufficient
to prevail. Berg, supra note 11, at 1.
89
Id. at 4.
90
Francis & Silvers, supra note 5, at xxiv.
91
Jerome E. Bickenbach et al., Models of Disablement, Universalism and the International
Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps, 48 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1173, 1177 (1999).
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social causes of disadvantage are accounted for, what is left?”
Consequently, this Article takes a fresh look at the medical literature and
its application to developing a theory of disability.
B. Re-examining the Medical Literature: Two Views of Health
Despite the uncompromising character of the traditional medical
model of disability, theories of health, illness, and disease in the medical
literature have alternated between two divergent perspectives, a
93
functional model and an experiential model. This debate is significant
because it resonates with the underlying question of whether disability is
“a feature of the individual — a biological or medical personal limitation
— or a feature of society — a social limitation imposed on people in
94
virtue of their physical or mental differences.”
1. Functional Health and the Traditional Medical Model of Disability
The dominant paradigm of health in modern medicine is a biomedical
95
model that incorporates a theory of functional determinism. The work
of American philosopher Christopher Boorse provides the most clear
96
and influential explanation of that model.
According to Boorse, a healthy body is one in which every organ
makes at least its species-typical contribution to the goals of survival and
92
Ron Amundson, Biological Normality and the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
102-03 (2000).
93
Consider the two definitions of health found in the Oxford English Dictionary:
“soundness of body; that condition in which its functions are duly and efficiently
discharged” and “spiritual, moral, or mental soundness or well-being.” OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY. See also ROBERT A. ARONOWITZ, M.D., MAKING SENSE OF ILLNESS: SCIENCE,
SOCIETY AND DISEASE 8 (1998) (“these ideal typical notions have been in a state of dynamic
tension since antiquity”).
94
Introduction: Definitions: Who is Disabled? Who is Protected?, in AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES 87 (2000).
95
Indeed, even critics of a functional determinism approach to health concede that
“the dominant model of disease today is biomedical, with molecular biology as its basic
scientific discipline. It assumes disease to be fully accounted for by deviations from the
norm of measurably biological (somatic) variables. It leaves no room within its framework
for the social, psychological, and behavioral dimensions of illness.” George L. Engel, The
Need for a New Medical Model: A Challenge for Biomedicine, SCIENCE, Apr. 8, 1977, at 129,
reprinted in GEORGE L. ENGEL, FAMILY SYSTEM MEDICINE 318-19 (1992). See also Roberto
Moradacci, Health as an Analogical Concept, 20 J. MED. & PHIL. 475, 479 (1995).
96
The following discussion is based on two of Boorse’s main works on the subject, On
the Distinction Between Disease and Illness, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 49-68 (1975) [hereinafter
Boorse, Distinction] and Health as a Theoretical Concept, 44 PHIL. OF SCI. 542-73 (1977), as well
as a more recent response to criticisms of his theory, A Rebuttal on Health, in WHAT IS
DISEASE 3, 6-16 (James M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder, eds., Humana Press 1987).
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reproduction. Disease is a state that interferes with or prevents normal
functioning, defined as species-typical contribution to those goals.
Health, then, is simply the lack of disease, a state in which all of an
individual’s bodily or mental functions fall within a normal functional
range. Boorse assumes a notion of normal or natural function, which can
be objectively established by empirically observed biostatistical norms.
Accordingly, health and disease are individualized, biologically
determined, and objectively measurable states. In contrast, illness is a
subset of disease with normative aspects, and not purely a biostatistical
phenomenon like health and disease. According to Boorse, a person is ill
if and only if the person has a disease which is serious enough to be
incapacitating, and therefore is 1) undesirable to its bearer, 2) a title to
special treatment, and 3) a valid excuse for normally criticizable
97
behavior.
Boorse’s theory of health as an objectively measurable state of
functional normality continues to be influential in medicine and medical
ethics. In a 1981 address to the Association of American Physicians, then
president Dr. Donald W. Seldin asserted that medicine is “a very narrow
discipline,” with three necessary features, “biomedical science as the
underlying basis of medical theory and knowledge, its use for the
mitigation of specifically biomedical derangements (pain, disability,
98
premature death), and its application to the individual human being.”
99
He received a standing ovation. More recently, Norman Daniels has
argued that the preservation and restoration of normal function is a
primary goal of health care, citing Boorse as the authority on the
objectivity of normal function: “[T]he kinds of [health care] needs picked
out by reference to normal species functioning are objectively important
because they meet this high-order interest persons have in maintaining a
100
normal range of opportunities.” Indeed, Boorse’s influence can be seen
in the prevalence of functional assessment — evaluation of the patient’s
ability to carry out the basic activities of living commonly defined as
eating, turning over in bed, using the toilet, moving from place to place,
walking, dressing, and taking care of personal hygiene — as a measure

97

Boorse, Distinction, supra note 96, at 61.
Donald W. Seldin, Presidential Address: The Boundaries of Medicine, reprinted in THE
SOCIAL MEDICINE READER 244, 251 (Gail E. Henderson et al., eds. 1997).
99
Reported by Gerald T. Perkoff, The Boundaries of Medicine, in THE SOCIAL MEDICINE
READER 254-52.
100
Norman Daniels, Justice and Health Care, in HEALTH CARE ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION
290, 301 (Donald Van DeVeer & Tom Regan eds., 1987).
98
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101

of health.
The influence of Boorse’s theory of health as a personalized and
objectively measurable state of functional normality can also be seen in
the traditional medical model of disability. Disability appears as a
“chronic functional incapacity whose consequence was functional
102
limitations assumed to result from physical or mental impairment,”
and a person with a disability appears biologically abnormal and
103
104
inferior. Clinical measurement and verification of disability, as well
as the development of an index to evaluate function according to the
105
ability to perform tasks, are central to the traditional medical model.
This influence can be seen in recent Supreme Court decisions relating
106
to the ADA. In Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, the Court
found that an employee with carpal tunnel syndrome, tendonitis, and
other acknowledged impairments was not disabled within the meaning
of the ADA because her impairments did not significantly affect her
activities of daily life — such as the ability to “brush her teeth, wash her
face, bathe, tend her flower garden, fix breakfast, do laundry, and pick
up around the house” — but merely affected the specific tasks of her
107
108
job.
Similarly, in Albertsons v. Kirkenburg
the Court upheld
Albertson’s failure to rehire a driver with monocular vision because he
did not meet the Department of Transportation’s basic vision standards
(even though he obtained a waiver of the standards under an
experimental program). The Court focused on specific activities of daily
living and found that although monocular vision is a physical

101
Of course, functional assessment could be expanded to include aspects of
psychosocial functioning, including cognition, behavior, and participation in social
activities, or instrumental activities of daily living defined as cooking, shopping, using the
telephone, doing laundry, managing medication, doing ordinary work around the house
and using transportation. See Naoki Ikegami, Functional Assessment and Its Place in Health
Care, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 598-99 (1995), available at http://www.nejm.org/content/1995
/0332/0009/0598.asp.
102
Scotch, supra note 3, at 214. This model assumed that the primary problem faced by
people with disabilities was the incapacity to work and otherwise participate in society. It
further assumed that such incapacity was the natural product of their impairments, and to
some extent their own “secondary psychological reactions to their impairments.” Crossley,
supra note 56, at 649.
103
See Scotch, supra note 3, at 214; Crossley, supra note 56, at 649.
104
See STONE, supra note 81.
105
Donald L. Patrick, et al., Toward an Operational Definition of Health, 14 J. OF HEALTH
AND SOC. BEHAV., 6 (1973).
106
534 U.S. 184 (2002).
107
Id. at 184.
108
527 U.S. 555 (1999).
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impairment within the meaning of the ADA, it did not in this case
amount to a disability because, in light of petitioner’s natural
compensation mechanisms, it did not substantially limit his major life
activities, including the major life activity of seeing.
Interestingly, despite the placement of the physician as the verifying
gatekeeper, in many contexts other than recent ADA decisions, the
definition of disability is linked to the person’s ability to perform his or
her job. In other words, disability is the medically verified inability to
109
work.
Accordingly, “[o]ur society has largely obfuscated the difficult
choices raised by these issues by delegating the assessment of the
functional impact of medical conditions to the medical profession. This
delegation reflects an assumption that such inquiries are subject to
110
scientific resolution and do not call for political choices.”
2. Experiential Health and the Social Model of Disability
Despite the present vitality of the functional model of health, there is a
compelling alternative — the experiential model of health. The work of
Swedish philosopher Lennart Nordenfelt provides the most clear and
111
influential explanation of this model.
According to Nordenfelt, the experiential model of health is based on
human welfare, defined as the ability of individuals to reach their vital
112
goals, rather than statistical considerations. Health is defined in terms
of “freedom from illness, the capacity for human development and self113
discovery, and the transcendence of alienating social circumstances.” A
well-known example of the experiential model is the World Health
Organization’s definition of health as “the state of complete physical,
mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or
114
infirmity.”

109

See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1) (1994); Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability:
Perspective of the Disability Community, 3 J. OF HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 352, 354 (2000).
110
Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social Welfare
System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361, 387 (1996) cited in Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical
Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 282 (1999).
111
Lennart Nordenfelt, Concepts of Health and Their Consequences for Health Care, 14
THEORETICAL MED. 277, 279 (1993).
112
Id. at 279-81.
113
Sander Kelman, The Social Nature of the Definition Problem in Health, 5 INT’L J. OF
HEALTH SERVICES 625, 629 (1987).
114
World Health Organization:
Basic Documents, 26th Ed., World Health
Organization, Geneva 1976.
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The experiential model of health departs from the functional model in
a number of ways particularly relevant to disability. The experiential
model of health rejects an objective, biostatistical concept of “normal.” It
critiques any definition of the goal of medicine as the preservation and
restoration of normalcy, because such a goal presumes that normality is
115
real, natural, and legitimate.
For example, philosopher Ron
Amundson has written that “to call a typical or average species member
‘normal’ is to assume a blueprint in the developmental process that
116
simply does not exist” from a Darwinian perspective.
Free from a
purely descriptivist and statistical definition of normalcy, the
experiential model of health can take into account variation based on
environment and mechanisms of compensation.
Rather than simply focusing on the parts and functions of the
individual, an experiential model suggests that inquiry should begin
with consideration of the well being of the individual as a whole, and
then proceed to a consideration of the parts of the human organism and
117
their various functions.
It rejects making the impairment, pathology,
or disease primary.
The experiential model of health entails viewing human beings as
active creatures living within a network of social relations. Proponents
of the experiential model vigorously denounce the “disentaglement of
the organic elements of disease from the psychosocial elements of human
118
malfunction.”
They reject an ontological, biomedical concept of
disease that assumes that “there exists some unadulterated biological
core that is the real disease and that this biological core is frequently
119
obscured and distorted by beliefs and attitudes.”
Instead, health and
illness are defined as social experiences occurring in the context of
120
culture:

115

Amundson, supra note 92, at 104-05.
Id.
117
LENNART NORDENFELT, ON THE NATURE OF HEALTH: ACTION-THEORETIC APPROACH
(1987); Nordenfelt, supra note 111, at 277-86; Lennart Nordenfelt, On the Relevance and
Importance of a Notion of Disease, 14 THEORETICAL MED., 15 (1993) [hereinafter Nordenfelt,
Relevance].
118
Engel, supra note 95, at 318: (citing RF Illustrated 3, 5 (1976)).
119
ARONOWITZ, supra note 93, at 171.
120
NORDENFELT, supra note 117, at 92; see also Leon Eisenberg, The Subjective in Medicine,
27 PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY & MED. 48 (1983). “To provide a basis for understanding the
determinants of disease and arriving at rational treatments and patterns of health care, a
medical model must also take into account, the patient, the social context in which he lives,
and the complementary system devised by society to deal with the disruptive effects of
illness, that is, the physician role and the health care system.” Engel, supra note 95, at 324.
116
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Physicians diagnose and treat diseases, which are thought of as
entities independent of subjectivity, manifest in abnormalities in
bodily structure and function. In this view, a disease is the same
wherever in the world it occurs, whatever beliefs may be held
regarding its genesis or cure, and whomever it affects; by definition,
its pathology can be verified by agreed upon “objective” methods.
Yet even casual familiarity with the history of medicine indicates
121
just how mutable and dynamic disease constructs are.

Indeed, as Robert A. Aronowitz writes in Making Sense of Illness,
“consensus about illness is usually reached as a result of negotiations
among the different parties with a stake in the outcome. Insights from
the clinic and laboratory create options for a new disease or a different
meaning of an existing name, but do not ultimately determine the
122
outcome of a largely social process of negotiation.”
The experiential model also recognizes the subjective or value-laden
nature of health. It challenges the functional model’s distinction between
disease — conceptualized as an objective pathology — and illness —
conceptualized as a subjective, social experience. Instead, it posits
123
disease pathology as mutable and dynamic.
As one proponent
accurately observes, “[t]he boundaries between health and disease,
between well and sick, are far from clear and never will be clear, for they
124
are diffused by cultural, social, and psychological considerations.” As
a result, the experiential model has room for the genuine discrepancy
between illness as actually experienced by the patient, and as
conceptualized by the biomedical model. Nordenfelt observes that
“[m]any bodily and mental states which are intuitively considered to be
diseases or signs of ill health, need not involve any statistical abnormal
function” and conversely, that given certain environments, “a certain
125
reduction of function can in fact be the statistically normal one.”
For
example, tooth decay is considered a pathology to be treated, but is
sufficiently prevalent to be considered a statistical norm. Thus, although
not totally subjective, “[w]hen individuals experience discomfort and
dysfunction, they can be considered ‘ill’ only when such manifestations
126
are recognized as illnesses according to community standards.”
121

Eisenberg, supra note 120, at 54.
ARONOWITZ, supra note 93, at 1.
123
Eisenberg, supra note 120, at 54.
124
Engel, supra note 95, at 332-33.
125
Nordenfelt, supra note 111, at 279.
126
“Neither disease nor illness are infinitely malleable both are constrained by biology
and by culture.” Nordenfelt, Relevance, supra note 117, at 59.
122
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The experiential theory of health resonates strongly with the view that
disability is subjective, flexible, and profoundly contextual. Even a
cursory review of the literature on disability reveals that definitions vary
127
according to time, place, and culture.
One well known example is
128
Nora Ellen Groce’s study of hereditary deafness on Martha’s Vineyard.
A community on the island experienced a high incidence of hereditary
deafness over a 200-year period. In response, in addition to spoken
English, all members, both hearing and deaf, knew and used an early
form of sign language to communicate. Groce found that in this
bilingual community, deaf community members enjoyed equality in
childhood, education, marriage, making a living, economic success, town
affairs, legal responsibility, social life, and community life. Indeed, she
notes that community members, both hearing and deaf, did not consider
deafness to be a disability — “[t]hey were just like everyone else. . .
129
[e]veryone here spoke sign language.”
The deaf did not feel
stigmatized until summer people arrived and branded them
130
“primitives” or “retarded.” Groce concludes that disability is a socially
constructed category, and that “[t]he Martha’s Vineyard experience
suggests strongly that the concept of a handicap is an arbitrary social
category. And if it is a question of definition, rather than a universal
given, perhaps it can be redefined, and many of the cultural
preconceptions summarized in the term ‘handicapped’ as it is now used,

127

For example, the SSDI benefits program defines disability as:
(A) Inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months; (2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A) — An
individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or
mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable
to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate
area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or
whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding
sentence (with respect to any individual) “work which exists in the national
economy” means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region
where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.

42 U.S.C. § 432(d)(1)(1994).
128
NORA ELLEN GROCE, EVERYONE HERE SPOKE SIGN LANGUAGE (Harvard Univ. Press
1985).
129
Id. at 2.
130
Id. at 95.
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131

eliminated.”
The social construction of disability sees “nonbiological factors —
beliefs, economic relationships, societal institutions — as greatly
132
influencing, if not defining, our understanding of [disability].”
This
echoes the insights of Feminist and Critical Race scholars. Feminist
scholars, for example, noted that “as the twentieth century began, the
inferior status and attenuated social participation of women and people
of color were portrayed as being natural consequences of their
133
differences in talent and character.”
They also exposed the ways in
which “medical discourses have historically constituted a site of sexual
discrimination, using medic-scientific justification for differentiating
women from men on the basis of biology and anatomy and to provide
134
‘scientific evidence’ to prevent women from entering public life.” As it
relates to disability, “[t]he social constructionist approach does not
necessarily call into question the reality of disease or illness states or
bodily experiences, it merely emphasizes that these states and
experiences are known and interpreted via social activity and therefore
135
should be examined using cultural and social analysis.”
III.

DEBATING DISTRIBUTION: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND
COSTS

A second, related reason for inconsistent outcomes is an ambivalent
attitude toward the costs of antidiscrimination law, often expressed as a
tension between the languages of efficiency and of rights. In the context
of disability-based discrimination in the workplace, this ambivalence is
evident in the “deep tension between the view of disability
discrimination as a civil rights problem, and the view of disability

131

Id. at 108.
ARONOWITZ, supra note 93, at 57. In addition to its relationship to an experiential
theory of health, social constructionism is linked to the emergence of poststructuralism,
second-wave feminism and Foucauldian scholarship. DEBORAH LUPTON, MEDICINE AS
CULTURE: ILLNESS, DISEASE AND THE BODY IN WESTERN SOCIETIES 11 (1994) (social
constructionism is not new, but “the growing predominance of poststructuralist analyses of
issues surrounding concepts of reality and bodily experiences in the humanities and social
sciences has given renewed vigor and intellectual interest in its application to the area of
the sociology of health and illness after a long period of marginalization.”)
133
Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 15 (Anita Silvers et al. eds., 1998)
[hereinafter Silvers, Formal Justice].
134
LUPTON, supra note 132, at 131.
135
Id. at 11.
132
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discrimination as a social safety net issue.”
Although arguably both
efficiency and rights may provide a basis for legislation such as the
137
ADA, the tension between them bears close examination in light of the
tight relation between the construction of disability and the nature of
disability rights.
A. The Language of Efficiency and the ADA
1. Neoclassical Economic Model
The language of efficiency is exemplified by the neoclassical economic
model of the labor market. Simply stated, the goal of the neoclassical
economic model of the labor market is to “achieve legal regimes whose
efficiency mirrors those attained in an ideal market of perfectly
138
competitive equilibrium.” Of course, efficiency has a special meaning,
typically wealth-maximizing or at least wealth-enhancing. For example,
a Pareto model of efficiency provides that a distribution is efficiency
enhancing if it increases aggregate wealth and also increases the wealth
of all parties to it. In contrast, the more utilitarian Kaldor-Hicks
formulation provides that a distribution is efficient if it generates
aggregate benefits that exceed the total losses imposed, so that the
winners could, in theory, compensate the losers so that no individual
would be worse off than they were prior to the distribution and at least
one person would be better off. In the ADA context, an efficiency
analysis might begin by comparing employer costs of reasonable
accommodation
to
the
employee
benefits
of
reasonable
139
accommodation.

136

Francis & Silvers, supra note 5, at xv.
See C. Edwin Baker, Utility and Rights: Two Justifications for State Action Increasing
Equality, 84 YALE L.J. 39, 48 (1975).
138
Michael Ashley Stein, Labor, Markets, Rationality and Workers with Disabilities, 21
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 314, 314 (2000). This article was a major source of inspiration for
this section, as it examines and critiques the application of the neoclassical labor market, as
defined by Professor Epstein and his supporters, to Title I of the ADA. In particular, it
identifies the three main justifications of Professor Epstein as discussed below, and
analyzes four faulty assumptions underlying the justifications: over-reliance on the
rationality of the market model, inaccurate assessment of the productivity of workers with
disabilities, inappropriate weighing of co-worker and client “distaste” for workers with
disabilities, and omission of significant benefits of employees with disabilities.
139
See, e.g., Douglas A. Leslie, Accommodating the Disabled, www.legalessays.com (1999).
137
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According to the neoclassical economic model, antidiscrimination
140
statutes are inefficient and unnecessary. For example, Richard Epstein
argues that prejudice against people with disabilities is rational and
141
efficient, and the ADA is inherently inefficient.
Professor Epstein’s
argument that the costs of reasonable accommodation outweigh its
potential benefits rests principally on three grounds for believing that the
potential benefits associated with reasonable accommodation of workers
with disabilities are inherently less than the costs they engender: people
with disabilities are inherently less productive than people without
disabilities; providing reasonable accommodation is always costly to the
employer; and providing reasonable accommodation incurs the social
cost of coworkers’ awkward and unpleasant feelings. Therefore,
requiring employers to hire people with disabilities when they would
142
otherwise choose not to requires those employers to bear costs.
Moreover, Epstein and his adherents argue, the costs to employers of
complying with the ADA greatly outweigh the benefits provided to
143
people with disabilities.
In the words of one economic critic, “[t]he
central flaw of the ADA is in the imposition on employers of a duty to
accommodate the mental or physical limitations of the disabled worker
or applicant without weighing the expected benefits of such
accommodation . . . This, in combination with the antidiscrimination
provision, distorts a civil rights measure into what is essentially a
144
mandated benefits program for the disabled.”
2. Critique of the Neoclassical Economic Model
The common critiques of the neoclassical economic model and its
application to antidiscrimination law fall along two lines: the model is
internally flawed because it relies upon incorrect assumptions and
incomplete data, and the model is inherently flawed because it
inappropriately subjects everything, including rights, to a cost-benefit
analysis.

140
Michael Ashley Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality and Workers with Disabilities, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 314 (2000).
141
See RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS (1992); Richard Epstein, Two Conceptions
of Civil Rights, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y J. 38 (1991).
142
See Stein, supra note 138, at 317.
143
See, e.g., Christopher J. Willis, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Disabling
the Disabled, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 715 (1995).
144
Carolyn L. Weaver, Incentives versus Controls in Federal Disability Policy, in DISABILITY
AND WORK: INCENTIVES: RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 5 (Carolyn L. Weaver, ed. 1991).
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As to the first line of critique, the central assumption of the
145
neoclassical economic model is that the market is rational.
However,
many have persuasively argued a set of theories to explain the
persistence of group-based employment discrimination — to satisfy a
146
personal preference or “taste” for discrimination, to achieve higher
147
status within the group, or to minimize the cost of employee diversity
148
and divisiveness. Specifically, disability can evoke irrational behavior
that is not inherently different than parallel historical responses by the
149
dominant majority to the exclusion of other groups.
As to the second line of critique, there is substantial empirical evidence
refuting the valuation of costs and benefits in the context of employment
of people with disabilities. As noted above, an efficiency analysis would
compare employer costs of reasonable accommodation to the employee
benefits of reasonable accommodation. As to the employer costs, people
with disabilities are not inherently less productive. Even prior to the
ADA, studies indicated that employees with disabilities demonstrate
good to excellent work performance, no increase in insurance costs,
lower turnover than workers without disabilities, lower rates of
150
absenteeism, and lower rates of accident. Nor is providing reasonable
accommodation always costly. Although the size of the financial burden
on employers as a result of the reasonable accommodation requirement
is not clear, a review of the available data suggests that the majority of
151
accommodations cost less than $100 per employee.
Indeed, after a

145
A second faulty assumption is that efficiency can be measured in some objective
manner. As noted by Duncan Kennedy more than 20 years ago, efficiency is an
indeterminate concept, and there is no agreement as to how externalities can be measured
from the setting of entitlement. Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement
Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981).
146
GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (3d ed. 1971).
147
Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995).
148
EPSTEIN, supra note 140.
149
Stein, supra note 138, at 314. Here, too, the data is incomplete. Blanck & Marti, supra
note 49, at 359 (“Study is lacking on the relationship between employer attitudes and
behavior toward disability, and biases inherent in the purported qualifications required to
perform jobs.”); id. at 367 (“Another area worthy of study is the relation of employers’
organizational cultures to employment and work benefit decisions involving qualified job
applicants with hidden and perceived disabilities.”).
150
The March-April Issue of In the Mainstream reviewed 11 studies related to the
employment of persons with disabilities and the results were consistent among all studies
from 1948-1990.
151
A 1994 report from the President’s Committee on Employment of People with
Disabilities found that since October 1992, 68% of the accommodations made for workers
with disabilities cost $500 or less. See Epstein, supra note 25, at 394 n.11. “Materials in the
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review of the available data, one author concludes:
From an economic perspective, although the direct costs of the
accommodations for any particular disability tend to be low, many
companies regularly make informal and undocumented
accommodations that require minor and cost-free workplace
adjustments that are implemented directly by employees and their
supervisors.
For qualified employees whose conditions are
asymptomatic or controlled by medication, any such necessary
accommodations
are
typically
minimal.
Moreover,
accommodations involving universally designed and advanced
technology have been shown to enable groups of employees with
and without disabilities to perform jobs productively, costeffectively, and safely. These findings suggested that the direct
152
costs of accommodations may be lower than predicted.

As to the employee benefit, it is difficult to measure the value of
153
Moreover, the structure
reasonable accommodation to the employee.
of the comparison overlooks the benefits to the employer. As noted by
Michael Ashley Stein, such benefits may include: savings in recruitment,
training, and replacement expenses; higher productivity; greater
dedication, fewer insurance claims, a reduction of post-injury
rehabilitation costs, and more widespread use of available technologies;
public costs savings, including reduction of disability-related public
assistance obligations estimated at $120 billion annually; and intangible
benefits such as permitting people with disabilities to exercise all the
154
responsibilities of citizenship.

ADA’s legislative history indicate costs to businesses for reasonable accommodations are
expected to be less than $100 per worker for 30% of workers needing an accommodation,
with 51% of those needing an accommodation requiring no expense at all.” S. REP. NO.
116, (1989). A study commissioned by Sears, Roebuck, and Co. indicated that 69% of the
reasonable accommodations provided by the company cost nothing, 28% cost less than
$1,000, and only 3% cost more than $1,000. Moreover, the average cost to Sears of
providing workplace accommodations to employees with disabilities was less than $50,
compared with an average cost of $1,800 and $2,400 for terminating and replacing an
employee, respectively. See Blanck, supra note 25, at 283. A 1982 Department of Labor
study found only 22% of individuals with disabilities received any form of accommodation
under the Rehabilitation Act, and of that group 51% of the accommodations imposed no
costs and 30% imposed a cost of less than $500 per worker. See Tucker, supra note 25, at
930.
152
Blanck & Marti, supra note 49, at 379-80.
153
Gregory Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating “Undue Hardship” Claims Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L.J. 1 (1990).
154
Stein, supra note 138, at 326-27. See also Blanck & Marti, supra note 49, at 377-81;
PETER DAVID BLANCK, Studying Disability, Employment Policy and the ADA, in AMERICANS
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Others argue that even if these foundational assumptions and
valuations were corrected, the neoclassical economic model would still
be inherently flawed because it inappropriately subjects everything,
including significant rights, to a cost-benefit analysis. According to the
neoclassical economic model, if the ADA’s reasonable accommodation
provision is characterized as at least partially intended to enhance
155
efficiency by correcting market failures,
then where the cost of
accommodation exceeds its benefits, the employer should be able to
invoke the undue hardship defense and avoid making the
accommodation, because otherwise an inefficient activity will take place
and will reduce total wealth.
However, authors such as Gregory Crespi have forcefully argued that
this principally economic interpretation of the ADA is incorrect and
inappropriate:
The language of the statute, its legislative history, and the
inapplicability in the disability employment accommodation context
of the key premises underlying the economic efficiency orientation
all indicate that little if any weight should be given to efficiency
considerations in determining the availability of the undue hardship
156
defense for ADA-covered employers.

B. The Language of Rights and the ADA
As the quote above suggests, the language of rights is an alternative to
157
the language of efficiency.
In political theory, rights have been
understood as a serious entitlement that people have to some liberty,
service, or good, derived from social rules and institutional roles. Once a
right is recognized, it can be guaranteed through a legal enactment and
legally enforced through law. Rights are not subject to utilitarian

DISABILITIES 209, 212-14 (2000) (citing study commissioned by Sears, Roebuck, and
Co. that indicated the average costs to Sears for terminating and replacing an employee
was $1,800 and $2,400, respectively). Another benefit may be a reduction of the labor
market costs of churning and scarring. See J. Hoult Verkerke, An Economic Defense of
Disability Discrimination Law at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=170014.
155
Crespi, supra note 151, at 6-7.
156
Id.; see also Rebecca Hanner White, Deference and Disability Discrimination, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 532 (2000) (arguing jurisprudential and policy considerations strongly favor judicial
deference to the EEOC’s interpretation of the ADA).
157
Although rights are the subject of deep skepticism on the left, the possibility that
rights are valuable, not only as a means in the political struggle, but as ends in themselves,
has not been totally abandoned. See generally Anthony Chase, The Left on Rights: An
Introduction 62 TEX. L. REV. 1541 (1984).
WITH
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analysis. As Ronald Dworkin has argued, “a right is a claim which the
government would be wrong to override if the government’s only
grounds were that overriding the right would increase the well being of
the community as a whole. Thus, a right is a claim to have a certain need
satisfied even if having this need satisfied causes a decrease in total or
158
average utility.”
1. Negative and Positive Rights
Rights can be classified in different ways. One of the most influential
classifications, and the one most relevant to an examination of attitudes
toward disability-based discrimination, is Isaiah Berlin’s concept of
159
positive and negative liberties.
Briefly stated, a negative right is
freedom from interference. Classic examples of negative rights include
fundamental freedoms such as freedom of speech, religious tolerance,
and freedom from arbitrary arrest. A positive right is a freedom to act in
a positive way, which entails the provision by some individual or
institution of a valued service. Thus, positive rights require the state to
act positively to promote the well being of its citizens, rather than merely
refraining from interfering.
Modern courts accept the negative rights model in Constitutional
interpretation, and civil rights laws are generally interpreted as
160
declarations of negative liberty.
However, classification of the ADA
has been controversial because disability law and policy has traditionally
been framed as positive entitlements to benefits or services, designed to
161
assist those who are presumed to be dependent and not self-sufficient.
To paraphrase two disability scholars, it is one thing to repeal the
ordinances that require certain kinds of people to use the back door, but
quite another to require the construction of ramps, instead of or in
162
addition to stairs, up to the door. As one author has noted, “[c]laiming

158

Baker, supra note 137, at 48.
See generally Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118
(Oxford 1969).
160
See, e.g., David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
864 (1986); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271
(1990).
161
See, e.g., IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1485 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Developmental
Disabilities Bill of Rights Act of 1975, amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-83 (1994); Air Carrier
Access Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (1994); Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and
Handicapped Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. 1973ee (1994); Sections 501 and 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-797(b)(f) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Fair Housing
Act Amendments of 1988 (FHAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994 & Supp III. 1997).
162
Francis & Silvers, supra note 5, at xvii.
159
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a right to needs-based allocation generates powerful normative dissonance,
because where political rights are implicated, people expect allocations
to be based on the principle of equality, under which everyone is treated
163
the same.” Consider, for example, the passionate public responses to
golfer Casey Martin’s suit against the PGA pursuant to the public
164
accommodation title of the ADA:
“Casey Martin has always known that the PGA Tour requires
walking in order to compete, yet he feels he is special enough to
warrant special consideration. How much more selfish can you
get?”
...
“So what if you have had to face some adversity or someone has
died in your family? If you don’t qualify for the competition, you
simply don’t play at that level . . . . [Q]uit contributing to this stupid
theory that because someone can make you feel sorry for them they
165
deserve different treatment. . . Be a Man!”

Some have argued that the ADA is a welcome change from traditional
disability policy because it promotes negative rights. In particular,
philosopher Anita Silvers asserts that the ADA simply requires the
removal of barriers that make it more difficult for some than for others to
have access to major means of achieving the good life, such as education,

163
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY. J. OF EMP. &
LAB. L. 476, 509 (2000). Walter Y. Oi, Disability and a Workfare-Welfare Dilemma, in
DISABILITY AND WORK: INCENTIVES, RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 32 (Carolyn L. Weaver ed.
1991). (“the ADA undermines the goal of living independently; disabled people cannot
have it both ways. They cannot achieve true independence by demanding equal job
opportunities and equal access when the social costs of these rights are thrust upon the
general public.”).
164
PGA Tour Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 690 (2001) (holding that allowing disabled
golfer use of golf cart was required by Title III of ADA, despite walking requirements that
applied to association’s tours).
165
Alan Shipnuck, Martin Ruling Still a Hot Topic, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 6, 2001),
available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/inside_game/alan_shipnuck/news/2001/06
/11/on_tour/index.html. Compare the interview with Andrew Imparato, a disability
activist with the American Association of People with Disabilities. CNN Access, Disability
Activist on Martin Decision (May 29, 2001), available at http://www.cnn.com/2001/law/05
/29/scotus.golfer.cnn/index.html (“We saw this case as not being about an unfair
advantage or special treatment, but about all athletes having an opportunity to compete.”).
See also Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung and the Juggler’s Despair: The
Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television and Radio, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 223 (2000).
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166

employment, or health care.
Because those barriers result from
167
unfairly exclusionary or injurious practices, Silvers and others argue
168
In
that the ADA merely corrects a market shaped by discrimination.
addition, the employment title promotes a traditional concept of equality
of opportunity that merely limits the manner in which employers can
treat employees. Silvers conceptualizes this as “formal justice,” which
“aims at reforming processes central to the achievement of moral
connectedness so as to ensure their inclusiveness regardless of
169
disability,” and “[o]ffers recourse to individuals when mistaken or
misleading assumptions about disability weight commonplace practices
170
against them.”
Thus, the ADA is not about special benefits or
redistribution of material resources — a goal which would not address
the systemic bias that disadvantages people with disabilities — but
instead promotes access comparable to that of people without
171
disabilities.
More often, however, the ADA and its employment title are
understood as conveying positive rights, as it requires that employers
both refrain from discrimination and make affirmative reasonable
172
accommodations.
Significantly, the duty to reasonably accommodate
is not merely corrective because it is not premised on a showing of past
discrimination. As such, Title I’s reasonable accommodation provision
“appears to make a revolutionary break with the old ways of thinking
about discrimination while charting a new course of affirmative
173
obligations to ensure real equality.”
2. Critique of the Negative-Positive Dichotomy
The familiar critiques of the negative-positive dichotomy also fall
along two lines. First, there are arguments about which category certain

166
Silvers, Formal Justice, supra note 133, at 13; Anita Silvers, (In)Equality, (Ab)Normality,
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 J. MED. AND PHIL. 209 (1996) [hereinafter Silvers,
(In)Equality].
167
Silvers, Formal Justice, supra note 133, at 132.
168
Richard J. Arneson, Disability, Discrimination and Priority, in AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES 18 (2000).
169
Id. at 121.
170
Id. at 120.
171
Silvers, Formal Justice, supra note 133, at 13; Silvers, (In)Equality, supra note 166, at
209.
172
David Wasserman, Distributive Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION
147 (1998); see also Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 35 (2000).
173
McGowan, supra note 172, at 35.
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rights fit into. For example, many have argued that there have always
174
been both negative and positive rights within the Constitution. As
David Currie notes, “[f]rom the beginning there have been cases in
which the Supreme Court, sometimes very persuasively, has found in
negatively phrased provisions constitutional duties that can in some
175
sense be described as positive.”
176
Others challenge the dichotomy itself as false, as even classically
conceived negative rights require some sort of government funding or
177
state intervention.
Building upon the insights of the legal realists “to
the extent that rights enforcement depends upon judicial vigilance, rights
cost, at a minimum, whatever it costs to recruit, train, supply, pay and
178
(in turn) monitor the judicial custodians of our basic rights.”
As one
scholar has remarked, “[l]eave me alone” is not a transcendent, contextfree right, but a “rhetorical front behind which the meaning, costs, and
179
consequences of negative rights lie concealed.”
Certainly, there have
been costs of eradicating discrimination in the workplace — shifting
patterns and practices have always entailed costs. For example, Title
IV’s prohibition against sexual harassment in the workplace is “enforced
through the not-inexpensive efforts of the EEOC and state employment
180
agencies.”
Indeed, Title VII has provided women with a “positive
181
right to a less offensive workplace.” In this sense, the employment title
182
of the ADA is not unique, just more overt.
There are two possible consequences of this latter critique of the
negative-positive dichotomy. A blurry or nonexistent boundary may
justify further extension into the area of positive rights. Indeed, some

174

Currie, supra note 160, at 864; Bandes, supra note 160, at 2271 (offering philosophical
and common sources of conventional wisdom); Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding
Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 330 (1985).
175
Currie, supra note 160, at 886.
176
For a feminist critique of the foundations of both negative and positive liberty, see
Diana Coole, Constructing and Deconstructing Liberty: A Feminist and Poststructuralist
Analysis, XLI(1) POL. STUD. 83-95 (1993).
177
Aditi Gowri, Reproduction, Rights and Public Policy: A Framework for Assessment, 35
TEX. INT’L L.J. 13 (2000).
178
Patricia Illingworth & Wendy E. Parmet, Positively Disabled: The Relationship Between
the Definition of Disability and Rights under the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITES 6 (2000)
(citing HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, infra note 184 at 45). But see Tucker, supra note 52, at 336.
179
Gowri, supra note 177, at 18.
180
Illingworth & Parmet, supra note 178, at 13.
181
Id.
182
Id. See also Stein, supra note 139, at 314 (ADA does not radically depart from other
civil rights statutes and reasonable accommodation is not uniquely expensive).
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have praised the ADA for its embodiment of both positive and negative
rights — ”The genius of the ADA is that it forthrightly melds positive
and negative rights, creating a civil rights statute that goes beyond the
simplistic equal-opportunity-as-negative-rights model represented by
183
Title VII.”
The more troubling consequence is the subjection of all
rights to a cost-benefit analysis. For example, Steven Holmes and Cass
Sunstein assert that both the conservative and the liberal positions in the
current debate unquestioningly accept the negative/positive distinction,
and therefore either ignore the true cost of “rights” or reject all
consideration of the costs of “rights,” respectively. Instead, the scope of
any right always demands a trade-off analysis that weighs the expected
social costs of enforcing a particular right against those of those rights,
184
legal entitlement, and public policy objectives.
IV. BACK TO THE THREE FACES OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
As identified in Section I, despite a decade of litigation, there is no
consistent understanding of the reasonable accommodation requirement.
Indeed, there are three inconsistent distributive outcomes that appear to
comport with the reasonable accommodation requirement: cost-shifting,
cost-sharing, and cost-avoidance. Such disparate outcomes exist for two
reasons: a failure to develop a coherent and consistent theory of
disability, and an ambivalent attitude toward the costs of
antidiscrimination law. Accordingly, using a theory of disability
informed by an experiential definition of health and the associated
distributive analysis developed in sections II and III, respectively, this
section contextualizes and evaluates cost avoidance, cost sharing, and
cost shifting.
A. Cost Avoidance is an Unwelcome Return to the Past
Cost avoidance, whereby ERISA-regulated disability benefits and the
structure of ERISA’s remedial scheme are used by employers to avoid,
183

Illingworth & Parmet, supra note 178, at 8.
STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS
ON TAXES (W.W. Norton 1999). Both the conservative and the liberal positions in the
current debate unquestioningly accept the negative/positive distinction, and therefore
either ignore the true cost of “rights” or reject all consideration of the costs of “rights,”
respectively. Instead, the scope of any right always demands a trade-off analysis that
weighs the expected social costs of enforcing a particular right against those of those rights,
legal entitlement and public policy objective. For a review and criticism, see generally
Jonathan M. Barnett, Rights, Costs, and the Incommensurability Problem, 86 VA. L. REV. 1303
(2000).
184
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consciously or unconsciously, the duty of reasonable accommodation of
employees with disabilities, returns to a strong medical-functional model
of disability and operates as a modern form of safety net for those
deemed unfit for the self-defined workplace.
1. A Strong Medical-Functional Model of Disability
The cost avoidance outcome is strongly linked with the traditional
medical model of disability and the functional model of health. The
worker with a disability is seen as biologically abnormal, inferior, and
unfit for the demands of the workplace. The emphasis on individual
biological function and impairment to the exclusion of environmental
context makes the unemployment of people with disabilities appear as a
185
“simple fact of nature” rather than a social phenomenon.
Cost avoidance also places the (seemingly) objective science of
medicine at the center of the process, as most plans require a worker to
submit sufficient objective medical evidence of his or her disability as
186
part of the benefits application process. Clinical measurement and
verification of disability, and particularly the use of indexes to evaluate
187
function according to the ability to perform tasks, are prevalent.
Individual physicians serve “to validate the existence of the disability
and therefore provide an individual with access to whatever social
188
assistance may be available to disabled persons.”
Despite the use of
physicians as gatekeepers, the definition of disability is frequently keyed
to the person’s ability to perform his or her job. In other words,
189
disability is the medically verified inability to work.
Insistence upon
individual, clinical verification medicalizes, and therefore depoliticizes,
190
the social causes of disability.

185

Amundson, supra note 92, at 105.
See cases cited, supra note 38.
187
See cases cited, supra note 38; Vlas v. Raythem Employees Disability Trust, 244 F.3d
27 (1st Cir. 2001); Goad v. Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc., 8 Fed. Appx. 524, 2001
WL 493403 (6th Cir. 2001); Heller v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see
also, Patrick et al., supra note 105.
188
Crossley, supra note 56, at 650.
189
See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1) (1994); Kaplan, supra note 109, at 354.
190
Lupton, supra note 132, at 108 (“doctors are called upon to make authoritative
judgments for the legal system, employers and other social authorities; for example, when
examining an employee for superannuating purposes or sick leave certification, or when
assessing the extent of disability of the disabled, or when pronouncing death. Doctors have
the power to certify whether a person is physically able to work or not, and to decide when
a patient should return to work. This doctor-patient interaction may reinforce the
definition of health as the ability to work, for ‘the healthy person is the person who
186
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From the perspective of a former worker with a disability, “[b]eing
seen as the object of medical treatment evokes the image of many
ascribed traits, such as weakness, helplessness, dependency,
regressiveness, abnormality of appearance, and depreciation of every
191
mode of physical and mental functioning.” It may also require him or
her to assume the sick role, which excuses the individual from the
192
normal obligations of society, including going to work.
According to
American sociologist Talcott Parsons, “ill persons are exempted from the
performance of social obligations which they are normally expected to
fulfill, they are not blamed for their condition, and they need not feel
guilty when they do not fulfill their normal obligations; however, ill
people must want to try and get well — if they do not, they can be
accused of malingering; and being sick is defined as being in need of
medical help to return to ‘normality’ — the sick must put themselves
193
into the hands of medical practitioners to help them get well again.”
The emphasis on the disability and the assumption of the sick role may
also trigger the spoiling process, whereby the physical impairment
obscures all other characteristics behind the one and swallows up the
194
social identity of the individual within that restrictive category.
2. Special Distributions for Unsuitable Workers
Because disability is seen as a personal misfortune, a private and
voluntary remedy such as cost avoidance appears appropriate. ERISA
does not require that employers provide disability benefits or provide
any minimum benefits or eligibility standards. No employee with a
disability has a right to insist that his employer provide disability
benefits, although many employers choose to do so. Moreover, any
benefits or assistance that the employer chooses to offer are subject to the
terms of the plan drafted and agreed upon by the employer and the
insurance company, if any.
The cost-avoidance outcome deems disability a legitimate excuse from
economic self-sufficiency, and provides disability benefits as a safety net.
The cost avoidance model looks a lot like traditional U.S. disability
produces.’”). See also Berg, supra note 11, at 44 (“[a] practice of determining disability on an
individualized basis undermines a sustained political consciousness among people with
disabilities, and, in turn, undermines a unified disability rights movement.”).
191
Irving Kenneth Zola, Self, Identity, and the Naming Question: Reflection on the Language
of Disability, in THE SOCIAL MEDICINE READER 77, 79 (Gail E. Henderson et al. eds, 1997).
192
Kaplan, supra note 109, at 353-54.
193
Lupton, supra note 132, at 7.
194
Zola, supra note 191, at 79.
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policy, such as the Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental
Security Income Benefits (“SSDIB”) program, which guarantees a
195
subsistence income to persons with total, long-term disabilities.
Neither of these traditional programs nor the cost-avoidance outcome
offers individuals enough money to participate fully in the life of the
community, or the status and satisfaction that come from economic self196
sufficiency.
The construction of the disability benefits also strongly suggests that
employees with disabilities either “overcome” their limitations in order
to meet the non-negotiable demands of the workplace, or remain
permanently unemployed. The worker with a disability is seen as
simply unable to work and unsuitable for the work environment.
Instead of examining environmental barriers, the best way to help the
disabled person is to use either medicine to cure or ameliorate the
impairment, or rehabilitation techniques to enable the person to cope
with or overcome the impairment’s effects. “The primary thrusts of
social policy regarding disability are both to eliminate as much disability
as possible, by using medical technology to cure existing disability or
prevent future disability, and to use rehabilitative techniques to help
disabled individuals approximate dominant physical standards as
197
closely as possible.” The two-tiered definition of disability common to
many plans suggests that disability from your “own occupation” should
be temporary — the former employee on disability leave is encouraged
198
to overcome the disability through medical care, to seek medical care
to heal or “adapt themselves to the demands of productivity set in the
199
marketplace.”
After expiration of that period, the worker will either
200
return to his occupation, retrain for another suitable occupation, or

195

See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1994) (SSDIB), 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (SSI) (1994).
See David E. Bernstein, Roots of the Underclass: The Decline of Laissez-Faire
Jurisprudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 119-36 (1993), for
the position that welfare programs tend to trap individuals in a low-income underclass,
and are therefore less desirable than measures that lead to integration into the workforce.
197
Crossley, supra note 56, at 652.
198
And, an employee is often required to have continuous medical care to continue to
receive benefits. See, e.g., Lown v. Continental Cas. Co., 238 F.3d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 2001)
(defining total disability as “continuously unable to perform the substantial and material
duties of his regular occupation . . . and under the regular care of a licensed physician other
than himself”).
199
See Scotch, supra note 3, at 219.
200
At least one court has held that even an involuntary return to work for financial
reasons disqualifies an employee from receiving disability benefits. Galman v. The
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15415 (8th Cir. June 28, 2001). In that
case, the court rejected plaintiff ‘s argument that such a bright-line test created an incentive
196
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remain unemployed and continue to collect available benefits.
By focusing on adaptations required from people with disabilities, the
cost-avoidance outcome requires very little from employers beyond
establishment of a disability benefits plan. It does not incorporate any
concept of reasonable accommodation or any other form of
201
environmental alteration.
Thus, private employers continue to define
202
work and “normal” workplace standards.
There is no recognition of
the disability category as a political and nonneutral instrument of the
203
employer to control the workforce.
Consider Professor Susan
Wendell’s personal example of disabling workplace rulemaking:
I am currently just able (by doing very little else) to work as a
professor three-quarter time, on one-quarter disability leave. There
has been much talk recently about possible increases in the teaching
duties of professors at my university, which would not be
accompanied by any reduction in expectations for the other two
components of our jobs, research and administration. If there were
to be such an increase in the pace of professors’ work, say by one
additional course per term, I would be unable to work more than
half-time (by the new standards) and would have to request halftime disability leave, even though there had been no changes in my
physical condition. Compared to my colleagues, I would be more
work-disabled than I am now. Some professors with less physical
limitation than I have, who now work full-time, might be unable to
work at the new full-time pace and be forced to go on part-time
disability leave. This sort of change could contribute to disabling
204
anyone in any job.

Or consider an example from a recent Supreme Court case, Toyota Motor
205
Ms. Williams began working at an
Manufacturing v. Williams.
automobile manufacturing plant in 1990 on the engine fabrication
assembly line. When use of the pneumatic tools on the assembly line
caused pain in her hands, wrists, and arms, diagnosed as bilateral carpal

for ERISA fiduciaries “to initially deny claims, force employees back into the workplace,
and then deny the claim again on appeal on the basis that the employee is working.” Id. at
*5.
201
Scotch, supra note 3, at 217.
202
Iris Marion Young, Disability and the Definition of Work, in AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES 171 (2000).
203
Id. at 171-73.
204
SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON
DISABILITY 38 (1996).
205
534 U.S. 184 (2002).
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tunnel syndrome and bilateral tendonitis, she was transferred to
modified duty jobs. In 1993, she was transferred to a paint and body
inspection line, which required visual and manual inspection tasks. In
light of her medical restrictions, she performed only the visual inspection
for several years without incident. However, in 1996, her employer
instituted a new requirement that all paint and body inspection line
employees perform both visual and manual inspection, and she once
again began to experience pain in her neck and shoulders that interfered
with her ability to perform her job. Thus, Ms. Williams was transformed
from adequate worker to inadequate worker by virtue of her employer’s
policy change in 1996.
In the realm of disability policy, the idea that rules can disable is not
new. In fact, one early definition of the word “disabled” is “incapacity
206
recognized or created by law; legal disqualification.”
To disable a
person is to disqualify legally, to pronounce legally incapable. The
“disabling” of employees who could perform the essential function of
their jobs with reasonable accommodation is particularly disturbing
because people with disabilities want to work. A survey cited in the
legislative history of the ADA reports that a large majority of the twothirds of working age persons with disabilities who do not have jobs say
that they want to work and 82% of people with disabilities said they
207
would give up their government benefits in favor of a full-time job. A
more recent survey by the Harris polling organization reported that of
persons who identified themselves as having disabilities who were not
working and were ages 16 to 64, 79% said that they would prefer to be
208
working.
Finally, the cost-avoidance outcome is incompatible with the stated
purpose of the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities” and
“to bring those individuals into the economic and social mainstream of
209
American life.”
Instead, it looks like a private, voluntary form of the
traditional U.S. policy toward people with disabilities, the creation of a
206

NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 682 (Leslie Brown ed., Clarendon Press

1993).
207
H. R. Rep. No. 101-485 (II), pt. 2, at 32 (1990) (citing the ICD Survey of Disabled
Americans: Bringing Disabled Americans into the Mainstream 47-50), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314.
208
LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
55 (1994). A recent survey in a large state found that 72% of persons with disabilities who
are unemployed want to work. Minette McGhee, Justice is Blind-for One Day: Court Gets
Lesson on Disability, CHI. SUN TIMES, Nov. 19, 1992, at 22.
209
42 U.S.C. §12101-12213 (Supp. V 1990).
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public entitlement program such as SSDIB, that trades inclusion in the
workplace for cash benefits. In contrast to the ADA, the alternate
statutory structure into which workers are diverted, ERISA, is clearly not
210
a civil rights statue, nor is its sole aim to protect workers.
Indeed, it
strips the plaintiff of civil rights protections and offers very little
procedural or substantive protection in return. Thus, the practical result
of the cost avoidance outcome for people with disabilities  exclusion,
isolation, and economic dependence  is the very problem that the ADA
seeks to remedy.
B. Cost-Sharing is an Uncertain Bargain
Cost-sharing, whereby the structure of reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship creates a zone of bargaining in which the minimum the
individual with a disability is willing to accept is less than the maximum
the employer is willing to offer, is linked to a weaker medical-functional
model of disability and offers only the possibility of a privately
negotiated remedy.
1. A Weak Medical-Functional Model of Disability
As with the cost-avoidance outcome, the worker with a disability is
seen as biologically abnormal and inferior and potentially unfit for the
workplace. However, the consequence of the impairment is subject to
negotiation.
There is at least the possibility of focusing on
environmental issues, such as changes to the workplace, in addition to
the individual biological functioning and impairment, but certainly no
guarantees.
It is not clear whether the cost-sharing model appoints the physician
as gatekeeper, as individual employers may or may not require objective
medical evidence or ongoing medical care. However, the definition of
disability would still be keyed to the individual’s ability to perform her
job, as defined by the employer.
2. Bargaining for Benefits
As with the cost-avoidance outcome, the cost-sharing outcome
recognizes that certain types of impairments can lead to social and
economic isolation. However, because disability is seen as a personal
210
See, e.g., Erik Nelson, Comment, A Poststructural Analysis of the Power and Class
Behind the Formalist Application of ERISA Preemption of State Law, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 175
(1998).
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misfortune, a private and voluntary contractual remedy appears
appropriate. Again, employees with a disability do not have a right to
insist that their employers bargain with them over accommodations,
although the structure of the incentives within the ADA may influence
211
employers’ decisions to do so.
Moreover, any benefits or assistance
that the employers choose to offer are subjected to the terms of the
negotiated agreement.
Cost sharing preserves, to the extent possible, the freedom of the
employer and the employee to bargain and to reach a mutually
satisfying agreement. Because both parties have a direct interest in the
outcome, cost sharing may focus more on the specific needs and desires
of the parties and provide an opportunity for a quick, economical, and
creative resolution. Evidence suggests that the vast majority of ADA
disputes arise in cases in which the employee is already working for the
212
employer, and the cost-sharing outcome may be particularly useful for
such employees. It seems logical that an employee with a satisfactory
employment relationship would be most likely to request and receive
accommodations that would allow him or her to continue employment.
Although cost sharing may result in some accommodation of people
with disabilities, according to Karlan and Rutherglen, the zone of
bargaining operates to decrease costs of accommodations, thus lessening
213
the impact of the property transfer.
This may be exacerbated by the
fact that the potential plaintiff faces a substantial risk in the courts. As
disability scholar Ruth Colker has documented, appellate court decisions
in ADA cases have been overwhelmingly pro-defendant since the ADA
214
became effective.
Thus the end result is likely distributions to
individuals with disabilities that are less than they are entitled to under
the ADA.

211
See Burkhauser, supra note 30, at 79 (“When a pathology begins to affect the ability to
work, important job related decisions must be made by both worker and employer. These
decisions may also be influenced by government policies. The worker will consider the
relative rewards of continued work versus applying for transfer benefits. In like manner,
the social institutions and legal mandates within which the firm must operate will
influence an employer’s willingness to accommodate the worker.”).
212
See John J. Donahue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN L. REV. 983, 984 (1991); Mudrick, supra note 23, at 70, cited
in Scotch, supra note 3, at 220.
213
See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 27, at 30.
214
Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R-C.L. L. REV. 99, 101 (1999).
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As with cost avoidance, cost sharing is problematic for those
215
antidiscrimination theorists who advocate a civil rights strategy.
Agreements are reached informally by private, interested actors, without
procedural protections or the public forum of the federal courts. Use of
this process may result in a diminished ability to identify and resolve
216
systemic, disability-based discrimination.
There is also no assurance
that employers will share their power to define work and acceptable
217
workplace standards, nor is there necessarily a recognition of the
disability category as a political and nonneutral instrument of the
employer to control the workforce. Although cost sharing has potential,
it appears to minimize any material redistribution as well as the
opportunity for cultural transformation.
C. Though Flawed, Cost Shifting is the Best Outcome
Cost shifting, whereby employers meet their obligation to provide
reasonable accommodation to make it possible for people with
disabilities to perform essential job functions and to secure equal
enjoyment of all terms and conditions of employers, faces significant
obstacles to implementation. Nonetheless, it is the best outcome because
it embodies a experiential-social model of disability and the potential for
both socioeconomic and political reconstruction.
1. A Potentially Strong Experiential-Social Model of Disability
Cost shifting shares strong links to a experiential-social model of
disability, which characterizes disability as subjective, flexible, and
profoundly contextual. The experiential-social model of disability rejects
making the impairment, pathology, or disease primary. In this sense, a
person with a disability need not be defined by that disability or
218
experience a spoiling of identity.
There is a great deal of empirical

215

Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 27, at 4-5.
These concerns echo the analysis of mediation and the ADA. See Ann C. Hodges,
Mediation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 30 GA. L. REV. 431 (1996); see also 2000 H.R.
4593 (a bill to amend Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, the VRA and the Civil Rights Act of
1991 to require the EEOC to mediate employee claims arising under those acts).
217
Young, supra note 202, at 171-73.
218
“An investigation of 145 physically disabled individuals found that, compared to
non-disabled persons, those with impairments did not rate their lives as less happy or
satisfying. The people with disabilities did, however, rate their lives as more difficult and
likely to stay that way. Another study of 88 seriously physically restricted persons posed
the question, ‘If you were given one wish, would you wish that you were no longer
disabled?’ Only half said they would wish to remove their disability.” Experiences of
216

PENDO

1222

5/28/2003 8:19 AM

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 35:1175

evidence that people with even serious disabilities report a quality of life
averaging only slightly lower than that reported by nondisabled
219
For example, one study indicated that people with
people.
impairments rated their lives as more difficult, but not less happy or
satisfying. Moreover, only half would use one wish to remove their
220
disability. Interestingly, physicians in particular estimate the quality of
life of their disabled patients to be much lower than do the patients
221
themselves.
The ADA provides that any impairment or inability must be viewed in
the context of the interaction between societal realities and choices and
the individual’s disability, and not in the context of the individual’s
disability per se. In that sense, the ADA’s explicit portrayal of disability
as socially constructed embodies the experiential-social model. Both
recognize that disability is a relational term, defined by individuals’
relationship to their specific environment. Rather than simply an
objective biological impairment, disability is an “uncorrected mismatch
222
between an individual and her environment.”
Accordingly, the
disadvantaged status of persons with disabilities is the product of a
hostile or inhospitable social environment, not simply the product of
223
bodily defects:
[D]isability is socially constructed by such factors as social
conditions that cause or fail to prevent damage to people’s bodies;
expectations of performance; the physical and social organization of
societies on the basis of a young, non-disabled, “ideally shaped,”
healthy adult male paradigm of citizens; the failure or unwillingness
to create ability among citizens who do not fit the paradigm; and
cultural representations, failures of representation, and
expectations. Much, but perhaps not all, of what can be socially
constructed can be socially (and not just intellectually)
224
deconstructed, given the means and the will.

Deviance, Chronic Illness, and Disability, in THE SOCIAL MEDICINE READER, 76 (Gail E.
Henderson et al., eds. 1997).
219
Amundson, supra note 92, at 106.
220
Experiences of Deviance, supra note 218, at 76.
221
Amundson, supra note 92, at 106; Harlan Hahn, Accommodation and the ADA:
Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 166 (2000).
222
Arneson, supra note 168, at 28.
223
See id. (using example of wealthy, talented, charming, legless person). An example
of how construction of physical environments can create disability is the construction of
buildings with stairs, rather than elevators or ramps.
224
WENDELL, supra note 204, at 45.
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The inequality visited upon persons with disabilities is rooted in social
practices that bar them from demonstrating their competence, not their
impairment, real or perceived. For example, from the perspective of
people who use wheelchairs, “disablement is experienced not as the
absence of walking but as the absence of access to bathrooms, theaters,
transportation, the workplace, medical services, and educational
programs  all those opportunities most other citizens expect to
225
access.
In the words of another author, “if a person in a wheelchair
cannot get to the post office in her town because there is no ramp or
elevator, a socio-political analysis will locate the problem in the design of
226
the building, not in her legs.”
2. An Opportunity for Redistribution and Social Reconstruction
Reasonable accommodation as cost shifting goes beyond distribution
of material resources, but also encompasses changes to the social
environment. In contrast to the medical-functional model, which seeks
to rehabilitate the disabled person, the primary thrust of policy under the
social model is to eliminate disability by “rehabilitating” the social
constructs that serve to impose disadvantages on persons with
227
impairments.
It also recognizes and seeks to remedy the use of the
disability category as a nonneutral instrument of the state and private
employer to control the workforce.
This dual value of reasonable accommodation as cost shifting
resonates with Nancy Fraser’s concept of a “critical theory of
228
recognition.”
Fraser, a political scientist, developed a concept of
“bivalent collectivities” that suffer “both socioeconomic maldistribution
and cultural misrecognition in forms where neither of these injustices is
an indirect effect of the other, but where both are primary and co229
original.”
For such collectivities, neither redistributive remedies
addressing socioeconomic injustice nor recognition remedies addressing

225

Silvers, Formal Justice, supra note 133, at 74.
Bickenbach et. al, supra note 91, at 1174.
227
Crossley, supra note 56, at 658.
228
Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘PostSocialist’ Age, in FEMINISM AND POLITICS 431 (Anne Phillips ed., 1998).
229
Id. Fraser explains, “[t]he remedy for economic injustice is political-economic
restructuring of some sort. This might involve redistributing income, reorganizing the
division of labour, subjecting investment to democratic decision-making, or transforming
other basic economic structures. . . . The remedy for cultural injustice, in contrast, is some
sort of cultural or symbolic change. This could involve upwardly revaluing disrespected
identities and the cultural products of maligned groups.” Id. at 434.
226
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230

cultural or symbolic injustice alone will suffice.
Finally, unlike cost avoidance and cost sharing, cost shifting occurs by
operation of the ADA and takes an explicit civil rights approach to the
issue of disability-based discrimination.
The ADA prohibits
impairment-based subordination, and promotes the view that disability
is not an inherent biological trait, but a “condition that results from the
interaction between some physical or mental characteristic labeled as
impairment and the contingent decisions that have made physical and
231
social structures inaccessible to people with that condition.”
Accordingly, the appropriate remedy is civil rights legislation to
eliminate the attitudes and practices that exclude people with actual,
past, or perceived impairments from opportunities to participate in
232
public and private life.
3. Addressing the Obstacles
Although supported in the history and language of the ADA, the
experiential-social model of disability and reasonable accommodation as
cost shifting face significant barriers to implementation. It is a
potentially transformative law captured by inappropriate biomedical
and efficiency analyses. However, the experiential-social model of
disability and its distributive implications can be used to reconstruct
reasonable accommodations flaws.
The most problematic barrier for the experiential-social model of
disability is the Supreme Court’s return to a narrower, biomedical model
of disability. As noted above, in the Supreme Court’s recent ADA cases
233
on standing, Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams,
Sutton v. United
234
235
236
Airlines, Murphy v. UPS, and Albertson’s v. Kirkingburg, the Supreme
Court focused on whether or not the plaintiffs’ impairments severely
damaged their capacity in everyday life, and not simply their capacity to
perform their actual jobs. In the words of the Williams court, “[w]hen
addressing the major life activity of performing manual tasks, the central
inquiry must be whether the claimant is unable to perform the variety of

230
231

Id. at 431.
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and Disability, 86 VA. L. REV. 398, 426

(2000).
232
233
234
235
236

Id.
534 U.S. 184, 122 S. Ct. 681 (2002).
527 U.S. 471 (1999).
527 U.S. 516 (1999).
527 U.S. 555 (1999).
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tasks central to most people’s daily lives, not whether the claimant is
237
unable to perform the tasks associated with her specific job.”
Such a
restrictive category reduces the pool of eligible plaintiffs — ”[t]he
judiciary’s insistence upon viewing disability as an essential, biomedical
fact — and its resistance to adopting a social political perspective — has
led to the construction of a highly restrictive category of disability that
reserves the law’s protection for the relatively few who fit the American
disabled ideal — men and women who struggle to independence and
238
self-support despite the most incapacitating of impairments.” This has
239
been a boon for defendants.
Despite the civil rights language, the civil rights approach often
240
appears an uncomfortable fit. It appears that the Court’s acceptance of
the “positive” aspect of ADA, the duty of reasonable accommodation, is
premised upon a very narrow definition of disability. Conversely, the
Court’s relative acceptance of the “negative” aspects of the ADA, the
duty to refrain from discrimination, results in significantly limited relief.
Many argue for a rejection of the dichotomy — ”The underlying
principle of the ADA is that people with a disability must be fully
integrated into society — that we must recognize the potential of all
members of society, disabled or not, even though it may cost money or
241
impose some burdens upon covered entities to reach this objective” —
however, this argument raises the risk that rights guaranteed by the
ADA will be subject to a cost-benefit analysis. In fact, the reasonable
accommodation analysis is being compromised by an economic and

237

Williams, 122 S. Ct. at 693.
Berg, supra note 11, at 49-50.
239
A comprehensive study of 1,200 court decisions by the ABA’s Commission on
Mental and Physical Disability Law found that employers have prevailed in 92% of final
judicial dispositions. See Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and
Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403 (1998); see also
John W. Parry, Highlights and Trends: Employment Decisions under ADA Title I Survey Update,
23 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 290, 294 (1999) (reporting that in 1998, employers
increased their win rate to 94%); Colker, supra note 214, at 160. For an exploration of
reasons for the seeming pattern of negative results, see Matthew Diller, supra note 82, at 19.
Paula Berg has analyzed its tremendous negative impact on the issue of standing, noting
that the majority of recent ADA decisions are exclusively concerned with the issue of
standing — whether plaintiff is “disabled” as defined by the statute — and the majority
conclude that they are not. Berg, supra note 11, at 2.
240
“There are numerous cases in which judges have treated the ADA definition as
though the purpose of the law is to provide a social benefit, rather than to protect an
individual from discrimination.” Kaplan, supra note 109, at 360-61, citing Van Sickle v.
Automatic Data Processing Inc., 166 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 1998), and Gilday v. Mecosta
County, 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997).
241
Tucker, Revolving Door, supra note 52, at 351.
238
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utilitarian analysis, in the form of the Court’s interpretation of the undue
burden test. The undue burden limitation severely limits the application
242
of the reasonable accommodation requirement, and ultimately reflects
243
business’s vision of integration as costly and intrusive. As Crespi has
argued, a Pareto model of efficiency provides that a distribution is
efficiency enhancing if it increases aggregate wealth, and also increases
the wealth of all parties to it — a standard that few, if any, legal rules can
satisfy. In contrast, the more utilitarian Kaldor-Hicks formulation
provides that a distribution is efficient if it generates aggregate benefits
that exceed the total losses imposed, so that the winners could, in theory,
compensate the losers so that no individual would be worse off than he
or she was prior to the distribution and at least one person would be
better off. However, Crespi observes, such a utilitarian approach is on
very tenuous grounds, especially in the disability employment context,
because “the allowance of a set of undue hardship defense claims which
individually and collectively satisfy Kaldor-Hicks . . . may well impose
244
substantial losses upon some group of disabled persons.”
Thus, the
distinction between rights and entitlement is eroded by subjecting both
to cost analysis. “If interpretation of the ADA continues in this direction,
it will increasingly function as a statute that balances limited
245
opportunities against their perceived costs.”
CONCLUSION
Using a theory of disability informed by an experiential-social
definition of health and the distributive analysis to evaluate the three
distributive outcomes demonstrates that, although flawed, cost shifting
is the best outcome because it embodies a truer model of disability and
the potential for both socioeconomic and political reconstruction. The
experiential-social model of disability and its distributive implications
can be used to reconstruct reasonable accommodation flaws — the
reinvigoration of a conservative medical-functional model within the
definition of disability, and the encroachment of an economic-based
efficiency analysis within the reasonable accommodation analysis.

242
It also endorses the perpetrator’s and not the victim’s perspective. See, e.g., MARTHA
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 167
(1990).
243
Sue A. Krenek, Note, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1969, 1973
(1994).
244
Crespi, supra note 151, at 33.
245
Francis & Silvers, supra note 5, at xxiii.
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This reconstruction offers the opportunity for a transition in disability
policy from a necessary but not sufficient social safety net to a more
complex system grounded in a fuller and more positive theory of
disability, and the recognition of the civil rights of people with
disabilities.

